Sharon K. Weiner, associate professor at American University’s School of International Service, joined Carnegie Corporation of New York in January 2022 as a senior resident fellow in the International Peace and Security program. Previously, Weiner served as a program examiner with the White House’s Office of Management and Budget, where she was responsible for budget and policy issues related to nuclear weapons and nonproliferation. In addition, she has worked for the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives and has held research positions at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security. She earned her PhD from MIT’s Security Studies Program and was named an Andrew Carnegie Fellow in 2018.
Her current research project, The Nuclear Biscuit, is a virtual reality experience that allows one to act as the president of the United States during a nuclear crisis. The goal is to understand how people make decisions in a crisis involving nuclear weapons, where the consequences are extremely high and uncertainty great. With her collaborator Moritz Kuett of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, Weiner is trying to determine whether people act according to the expectations of deterrence theory and engage in rational analysis, or whether individuals instead use one of any number of less than rational decision-making shortcuts, as predicted by behavioral psychology.
Weiner is the author of Our Own Worst Enemy? Institutional Interests and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Expertise (MIT Press, 2011) and the forthcoming Managing the Military: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Civil-Military Relations (Columbia University Press, 2022). The latter book offers an analysis of when the political power of the chairman of the JCS is maximized and can challenge civilian control of the military.
In the following Q&A, Weiner discusses the role of the nongovernmental sector in reducing nuclear threats, the need for public awareness of weapons programs and nonproliferation, what she hopes to accomplish during her time at the Corporation, and more.
Why did you decide to join Carnegie Corporation of New York as a senior resident fellow?
I grew up in rural Missouri in an area that would most likely have been destroyed by fallout had there ever been a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Besides geography, my connection to nuclear weapons and security includes being a researcher, an educator, and a government bureaucrat. But in each case, I got a snapshot of issues related to nuclear weapons. Carnegie Corporation promised a much wider aperture. The Corporation has been involved in trying to reduce the risks of nuclear weapons since they were first used in 1945. Besides a deep history, grantees have provided important insights around issues ranging from strategic stability to preventing nuclear war to trying to understand how individuals see their own relationship to nuclear threats. Working at the Corporation is akin to being given a seat at a library with a profusion of books on the issue that matters to you most, including some that are rare or unpublished. I came to the Corporation because I get to read these “books” and because I expect to learn, engage with intractable problems, make new discoveries, and help others reduce the dangers of nuclear weapons.
There is also a selfish reason: I get the joy that comes from enabling this through grantmaking. My own research has benefited greatly from the Corporation, which funded the program at Princeton University where I got my very first post-PhD job. And my Andrew Carnegie fellowship allowed me to research and write my first book, which analyzed cooperative threat reduction between the United States and Russia and went on to win a prize from the U.S. National Academy of Public Administration. My current research project – The Nuclear Biscuit – is an ambitious and time-intensive effort that I never could have imagined undertaking had I not been a Carnegie Fellow. To provide these opportunities for others, and especially people who are underrepresented in the nuclear security field, is a privilege.
What has been the impact so far of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on considerations of U.S. nuclear weapons policy?
Since the end of the Cold War, awareness and attention to nuclear weapons issues has tended to fade into the background. Periodically, some external event prompts a brief spat of attention. The attacks of 9/11 raised concerns about nuclear terrorism. A nuclear test by North Korea rejuvenates discussions of proliferation or missile defense, or the price tag on U.S. nuclear modernization goes up yet again and for a short time the cost of nuclear weapons gains traction. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine means that the fundamental purpose of nuclear weapons is now in play. Was Russia emboldened to attack Ukraine because the fear of nuclear escalation kept the United States and NATO from engaging more overtly in this conflict? In other words, did nuclear deterrence enable conventional aggression as is sometimes argued to be the case in the war Pakistan and India fought in Kargil? Or, alternatively, did nuclear weapons significantly increase the danger of even more catastrophic destruction because those weapons encouraged a competition in risk taking and brinksmanship? Post Ukraine, U.S. policymakers and civil society will have to weigh in on the fundamental purpose of nuclear weapons, including whether they should remain focused on deterrence of existential threats or if new, varied, and more nuclear options should be incorporated into otherwise conventional military planning. Should the threat of nuclear use be strictly limited and used only as a last resort, or is it acceptable or even desirable to continue to blur the line between nuclear weapons and conventional military options?
This debate on the fundamental role of nuclear weapons is a consequence of not just Russia but also China. Prior to Ukraine, there were already repeated arguments that Chinese nuclear modernization required a more nuanced, refined, and, according to some, larger U.S. nuclear arsenal. But treating China as a newcomer to the principle of deterrence known as “mutually assured destruction” seems to suggest that deterrence requires more than the ability to inflict hundreds of thousands of casualties on an adversary. Whether or not the same nuclear weapons, strike packages, and planning options deter China or both China and Russia is a debate that inherently calls into question the fundamental role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security.
What are you seeking to accomplish at the Corporation?
You mean besides helping to prevent nuclear war? That question would have sounded largely rhetorical until a few months ago. Certainly, I was aware of the Corporation’s focus in the 1980s on deescalating tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has elevated concerns about nuclear war once again. Identifying and enabling grantees to help reduce that risk has taken on a renewed urgency. But it’s not deja vu all over again. Although the language used in the current crisis is reminiscent of that from the 1980s and indeed the 1950s, today’s political, bureaucratic, and social dynamics create new nuclear dangers while requiring innovation in crisis management.
But coming up with analysis and answers isn’t enough. That information must be shared. My previous time working in both the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government gives me an appreciation for both the value of new ideas and alternatives but also an understanding of “The Blob” – that is, the relatively insular Washington, D.C., foreign policy community. I’d like to maximize the ability of that policymaking community to consider and learn from the ideas, analysis, and recommendations of our grantees.
What role can the nongovernmental sector play in reducing the danger of nuclear weapons? Isn’t this largely something for governments?
Deterrence and the threat to use nuclear weapons are justified by the U.S. government’s promise to protect Americans. In other words, the risks and dangers of nuclear weapons are intimately and irrevocably linked to people, even though decisions about strategy and military capabilities are the providence of government, usually with little input or oversight by average Americans. But everyone who lives in the United States has a right and responsibility to weigh in on nuclear issues. And the Corporation has a track record of funding efforts to help people use their voice to challenge status quo nuclear policies, suggest alternatives, and remind the government that the dangers of nuclear weapons are not hypothetical or confined to esoteric discussions among government bureaucrats in the United States, Russia, or any of the other seven countries that possess nuclear weapons.
The private sector and especially philanthropy also play a crucial role in advancing knowledge and holding accountable not just government decisions about nuclear weapons but claims that progress on reducing nuclear risks isn’t possible because of political roadblocks or a lack of feasible technical solutions. For example, it is groups outside of government that are studying the global effects of nuclear war, a subject that has been neglected by the U.S. government since the 1980s. When policymakers claimed that verification of arms control agreements wasn’t possible without revealing secrets about warhead design, it was academic researchers who proved them wrong. If you are under the age of 59 and grew up in the continental United States, you have not been exposed to fallout from a nuclear weapon test because of parents, not bureaucrats. At a time when the U.S. government claimed that above ground testing was necessary for national security, it was concerns from parents about the accumulation of strontium-90 in their babies’ teeth that helped create momentum for that 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty.
Additionally, sometimes it is just easier to say things through means other than official channels. Exchanges that are out of the public spotlight, such as Track II dialogues, have a record of allowing people to explore ideas, be creative or even wrong, and ask for clarifications of meaning and intent. This is where communication takes place, rather than position-taking or grandstanding. Such conversations have produced ideas that became official arms control agreements, led to reductions in nuclear arsenals, and eased tensions between countries that in public remain adversaries.
The active involvement of civil society, nongovernmental organizations, scholars, and even philanthropists is not only helpful in reducing nuclear dangers, it’s necessary.
What is needed in terms of public awareness when it comes to nuclear weapons programs and nonproliferation?
We are lucky that for most people nuclear weapons don’t compete for attention with other issues or occupy much space in memory. When polled, most support disarmament or abolition, but aside from punctuated and sporadic attention via current events, nuclear weapons are usually not part of the public consciousness. My guess is few people appreciate that a handful of individuals can authorize the use of entire nuclear arsenals with few checks or vetoes and in less than ten minutes. When they go to the polls, most votes don’t hinge on whether a presidential candidate can be trusted with the sole authority to launch nuclear weapons.
Yet deterrence – the strategy assumed to guide nuclear weapons decisions – presumes the president will rationally weigh the costs and benefits of any nuclear use before making a decision on behalf of all Americans. The reality – that people are prone to mistakes, misperceptions, and sometimes downright stupidity – seems to fade away. My own research using virtual reality to understand crisis decision-making shows that the norm is for people to act on gut feelings, without resolving uncertainties, and to then wish they had made a different choice. Public attention to nuclear issues tends to wax and wane with external events and the news. But U.S. nuclear strategy, plus the decision-making short cuts and psychological biases that are part of being human, mean that the dangers of nuclear weapons are present, constant, and significant.
How do we get people to not only acknowledge these dangers but act to reduce them? Part of the answer lies in engaging new and diverse groups of people. When new perspectives engage with a subject, they often ask fundamental questions that “the experts” have learned to ignore. In the process, they identify assumptions we’ve made but failed to reexamine, “facts” that are really stories we’ve constructed to justify our choices, and places where the status quo no longer fits the world around us. Diverse perspectives also help us better understand when people engage with the dangers and risks that are present in their daily lives, when those risks get pushed to the back burner, and when they lead to paralysis and inaction.
Sharon K. Weiner is a senior resident fellow in the International Peace and Security program at Carnegie Corporation of New York.
