When Diplomacy Is Not Enough: Managing Multinational Military Interventions

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A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict
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Carnegie Corporation of New York established the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict in May 1994 to address the looming threats to world peace of intergroup violence and to advance new ideas for the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. The Commission is examining the principal causes of deadly ethnic, nationalist, and religious conflicts within and between states and the circumstances that foster or deter their outbreak. Taking a long-term, worldwide view of violent conflicts that are likely to emerge, it seeks to determine the functional requirements of an effective system for preventing mass violence and to identify the ways in which such a system could be implemented. The Commission is also looking at the strengths and weaknesses of various international entities in conflict prevention and considering ways in which international organizations might contribute toward developing an effective international system of nonviolent problem solving.

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Foreword

THE MONUMENTAL CHANGES in the international security order over the past decade demand a reexamination of the circumstances and procedures regarding the application of military force.

Since the end of Operation Desert Storm, absent the brake of the Cold War competition and faced with a rising tide of instability, the United States has committed its armed forces to a wide range of military operations over thirty times. Currently, 50,000 American troops are deployed in various regions around the world, participating in thirteen ongoing missions. In each case, the introduction of military forces was made after a careful examination of the benefits of each particular operation and the inherent risks involved. In nearly every case, the United States used its forces in conjunction with the United Nations, regional security organizations, or both.

The United States and its partners initiated each one of these operations to secure specific objectives, such as to facilitate the humanitarian efforts of nongovernmental organizations, to enforce cease-fire agreements, or to secure diplomatic initiatives. While these operations have been undertaken as a *reaction* to an international crisis, they have most certainly served to

mitigate the threat of mass violence and have allowed the belligerent parties the latitude to further the process of peace.

Each operation must be judged on its own merit. However, our experiences of the past few years provide us with the added benefit of increasing our knowledge base and experience in developing a more systematic approach to dealing with international crises. Issues that at one time seemed almost intractable, such as forming *ad hoc* coalitions and establishing fully capable command and control structures for peace operations, are now becoming more workable in light of the lessons that we have learned.

This report, by one of America's premier strategic thinkers, is another step in that education process, and it advances the discussion on the proper use of force to alleviate the horrendous effects of regional conflicts. It is a thorough and thought-provoking study on the proper application of military power to forestall the escalation of confrontation and violence.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
18 April 1996

Preface

THIS STUDY is part of a larger effort by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict to devise ways of reducing mass violence in the international system. Included in the Commission's framework are attempts to define the problem of post-Cold War conflict, reveal the nature and cause of mass violence, devise a doctrine for triggering international responses to aggression, and finally to conceive a broad system of interrelated--although not necessarily interdependent--processes that operate at every phase of a real or potential conflict, from early warning and preventive diplomacy to military intervention and conflict resolution.

Although the Commission is primarily concerned with preventing the outbreak of violence and is therefore emphasizing means of early warning and conflict avoidance, its consideration of the constructive use of force in dealing with violence is twofold. First, the international community may not always be able to predict and prevent the outbreak of violence, and it must therefore develop the capability to mitigate violence, even if that requires using force. Second, the Commission hopes to contribute to the development of a system of intervention that is so predictable, rapid, and effective that its mere existence would act as a deterrent against mass violence.

The purpose of this study is to increase the Commission's understanding of how to facilitate timely and effective military intervention where such actions will help forestall mass violence. Obviously, military or even diplomatic intervention may not be appropriate in every case. The evidence shows that in many instances, international initiatives, of varying scope and duration, can have salutary effects. The record also shows, however, that there is much room for

improvement. The study advances an agenda of international action to meet the challenges of deadly conflict. At a minimum, it seeks to stimulate and broaden the debate on the use of force.

The study was conducted under the leadership of General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (Ret.), Co-Chair of the Atlantic Council of the United States and a member of the Commission's Advisory Council. General Goodpaster was assisted by C. Richard Nelson of the Atlantic Council, Rachel Epstein of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, and James Kiras of the Lester Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre. The study also benefited from the comments and suggestions of a wide range of political and military professionals from many nations with extensive experience in dealing with deadly conflict. The report was edited by Jeannette Aspden, the Commission's managing editor.

When Diplomacy Is Not Enough

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE END OF THE COLD WAR offers the world an opportunity for more effective cooperation to prevent or halt deadly conflicts, but it also poses new challenges. One such challenge is overcoming the reluctance of political leaders to take military action in this era of transition. Few leaders are willing to invest their political capital in risky, controversial international interventions with uncertain outcomes. And the effects of this unwillingness and consequent inaction are painfully clear: armed conflicts devastate communities and the lives of individuals, create refugees, disrupt international commerce, and undermine international norms. Unless the major security interests of the leading nations are directly threatened, however, substantial military involvement by the international community will be rare beyond peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations.

One legacy of the Cold War is thinking of the use of military force in terms of either doing nothing, or employing overwhelming forces in a decisive manner. Such thinking is no longer appropriate. A middle ground involving a more modest use of international force--in a limited but persistent manner--demands more attention. Such use of force, if required, would substantially raise the costs to an aggressor or a group that grossly violates human rights.

Leaders might be more willing to commit their states to international efforts to prevent or suppress conflict if they had more confidence in the ability of the international community to manage such an intervention successfully with limited losses. Such confidence, coupled with a clear understanding of costs, risks, expected duration of a contemplated intervention, and the prospects of success, would better equip leaders to make a compelling case and take the risks associated with military intervention.

MANAGING MULTINATIONAL FORCES

There are three choices for managing multinational forces: the United Nations, a regional organization, or an *ad hoc* coalition. In all cases a clear mandate that defines the purpose, scope, and--to the extent possible--the time frame of the military operations is necessary, along with an effective interface between the military commanders and the political leaders. This interface should translate broad political objectives into explicit military missions that, in turn, should determine the composition of the forces. Unified operational control of the multinational forces and systematic supervision with regular feedback to the political leadership are also vital elements of a management system.

Each arrangement for managing multinational forces presents diverse and difficult challenges. The United Nations is clearly not a war-fighting organization, so UN management will likely be limited to peacekeeping, and even in this restricted role, there is considerable room for improvement. Management by regional organizations is potentially promising, but to date both the political willingness and military capabilities are lacking, except in NATO. The North Atlantic alliance possesses a highly capable command and planning structure, and the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) is a promising concept, but turning the concept into a reality has been a slow process. *Ad hoc* "coalitions of the willing" are thus the most likely arrangements for managing multinational military interventions that go beyond peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, or noncoercive military support. The option of single-nation intervention, of course, remains open, but such actions are beyond the scope of this report.

Within the United Nations structure, the Security Council and the Secretariat each play a distinct role. The main role of the Security Council is to provide the ultimate source of legitimacy for multilateral military operations by making authoritative decisions on when, where, and for what purpose multinational forces are used. The UN's other role involves managing peacekeeping operations under the secretary-general in conjunction with his diplomatic role in conflict resolution. UN officials have gained considerable experience over the past 50 years, but the member states have not provided them with necessary resources to conduct these operations with full effectiveness, nor are they likely to do so in the foreseeable future.

More basically, the very concept of peacekeeping has serious limitations. Under existing doctrine, peacekeeping operations are undertaken only with the consent of the belligerents, and UN forces cannot use force except for self-defense. It should be noted that the focus of these efforts is on the latter stages of conflict, usually *after* a cease-fire agreement has been reached. In some cases, UN "peacekeeping" efforts did not in fact keep the peace, and confidence in the United Nations was undermined. More usefully, the international community should not limit its military efforts to peacekeeping; rather, it should be able to consider the use of military forces at any stage during the life cycle of a conflict.

Rigid adherence to the concept of impartiality can circumscribe active intervention by the international community in deadly conflicts. In several cases, preserving the principle of impartiality has limited the UN's options and frustrated many of the military and political figures

who tried to settle disputes. Military interventions must be fair and just in order to maintain legitimacy, but genocide, ethnic cleansing, and rape as a weapon of war all call for prompt and severe action. International intervention in such matters should be backed up by the credible prospect of the use of force, which may cause the belligerents to cease such acts or face consequences from the international community. Clear rules of engagement can go a long way in deterring abuse by the belligerents.

Regional organizations, in the view of many observers, including the UN secretary-general, should shoulder more of the load for military operations. For states bordering areas of conflict, the threat is more immediate, and they usually have a better understanding than more distant nations of the problem and its cultural context. Despite these advantages, most regional organizations have decided not to intervene militarily in conflicts, and they are therefore neither appropriately structured to manage military operations nor do they have the necessary resources.

In certain cases, *ad hoc* coalitions are a more promising alternative to UN and regional command arrangements. Nations that form *ad hoc* coalitions are self-selected states with a genuine interest in preventing or halting deadly conflict. They must either borrow from an existing command structure, such as NATO's, or rely mainly on the assets of the leading partners. Like-minded nations will often possess interoperable equipment, easing logistical problems, and many will have already conducted bilateral and multilateral military exercises. Since these coalitions usually involve one or more of the major powers, material and financial support is assured, and the depth and quality of military resources often exceed those available in the membership of regional organizations.

The main operational price paid by *ad hoc* coalition members is the lack of binding ties between coalition members. Sustained operations and mounting casualties can strain the bonds of coalition members in war situations, even when they share overall strategic interests. Coalitions are in constant danger of disintegrating during the course of difficult military operations, where over time national interests may take precedence over common interests. This was a major consideration during the Gulf War.

THREE KEY AREAS

Whichever management arrangement is selected, multinational forces must be suited to the task, with their number and composition based on the mission and the situation they are likely to encounter. But even with sufficient numbers and equipment, they are likely to be effective only if they are adequately staffed and supported in three key areas: command and control, intelligence, and logistics.

- **Command and control.** Command and control is the vital link between the leadership and the troops. It encompasses the analysis, planning, decision making, and communications necessary to direct military operations. Unified effort is the result of effective command and control. Without it, military operations are likely to be scattered and indecisive. It is a difficult and challenging task to establish a unified command arrangement, but if it is not clear who is in charge, ineffective operations are likely to result.

- **Intelligence.** Military operations are blind without timely and accurate information. Therefore, the initial planning for any military intervention must include provisions for intelligence support from several national sources. Military planners and commanders need to understand the political and economic context of the conflict as well as the tactical situation. Nevertheless, intelligence support has been a major weakness of most multinational military operations. This stems largely from an inherent reluctance to share intelligence because of concern for protection of the sources and methods by which it was acquired and developed.
- **Logistics.** Military operations cannot be conducted without a range of logistical support that includes airlift, sealift, and service support troops. Providing logistical support for multinational forces can be difficult because of national differences in equipment and procedures. Detailed information about local infrastructure, including water, power, and fuel supplies and transportation systems, ports, and airfields, along with health and other conditions that may affect military operations, must be included in operational planning. Both the UN and the United States have increasingly turned to commercial contractors to provide essential elements of logistical support.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In conclusion, the more effective use of multinational military forces to deal with deadly conflict will depend on how well we learn the lessons from previous efforts. A brief comparison of earlier conflicts and current hostilities suggests that decisions to use force will continue to be extraordinarily difficult for national leaders both individually and collectively. This burden can be lightened somewhat by increasing their confidence in the ability of the international community to manage the use of force effectively. This, in turn, will require fresh thinking on the use of force and the adoption of specific mechanisms to address the many shortcomings identified in the growing literature on previous military interventions.

Our contribution to this fresh thinking is to suggest some changes for all three types of management arrangement.

THE UNITED NATIONS

- Comprehensive contingency planning for the use of military forces should be undertaken by the UN in conjunction with regional organizations and coalitions. This planning should consider distinct but coupled phases of military operations, including deterrence, persuasion, humanitarian relief, and peacekeeping. The UN should manage peacekeeping operations involving observers and buffer forces in both the deterrence and peacekeeping phases. If and when needed, the regional organization or coalition should manage military operations aimed at compulsion. Contingency planning should also include techniques for handing off operations from coalitions or other organizations to the UN or vice versa.
- Improvements in rapid deployment and logistical support of forces, including greater utilization of commercial contracting, also would be beneficial.

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

- Persistent efforts should be made by political leaders to engage these organizations in discussions of ways of reducing the level of violence in their regions. These discussions should include the possibility of using multinational forces.
- Regional organizations that have responsibility for collective security within their charter should develop appropriate political-military interfaces to manage multinational military operations. NATO'S North Atlantic Council is a useful model. Also, a skeleton military headquarters and staff would improve the capacity of regional organizations to respond if the organization decides to employ forces.
- In most areas, highly developed capabilities such as those of NATO are neither necessary nor likely to be available. There are, however, some modest steps that could be taken to enhance capabilities for the use of multinational forces within a few years, and without substantial increases in expenditures. In some areas, regional military training centers could be established where facilities have become available with the downsizing of several national forces. The Organization of American States could use excess military facilities in Panama, for example. One uncontroversial role that such centers could play could be responding to natural disasters--a problem widely shared. These centers could build on the experience that many states have gained in dealing with floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, and fires. In the process of training for these situations, the military forces would improve their ability to function effectively as a team.

AD HOC COALITIONS

- More widespread sharing of national analyses of conflicts and of the costs, risks, and benefits of using military forces would be useful. These exchanges should help inform debate on when and how multinational forces should be employed.
- At the national level, leaders should seek to expand foreign policy objectives to include reducing the level of international violence. Unless leaders mobilize their countries to become involved in efforts to prevent or contain deadly conflict, all the efforts to improve the capacity of the international community to deal with deadly conflict will ultimately be of little use.
- National force structures may need to be adjusted to deal more effectively with foreign internal conflicts. For example, additional military police units may be needed as military forces become increasingly involved with operations that put them into direct contact with civilian populations on a regular basis.

1. THE CHALLENGE

AFTER THE COLD WAR--CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

The end of the Cold War presents opportunities for more effective international cooperation in dealing with conflicts, but it also poses new challenges. The first major test of post-Cold War collective security was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and the ensuing Gulf War raised expectations that international cooperation could deal more effectively with aggression than in the past. Some 40 countries, including such unlikely allies as Syria and the United States, sent more than 800,000 troops to reverse Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The response was facilitated by a series of strong UN Security Council resolutions that reflected nearly unprecedented agreement among the permanent members.

If the Gulf War raised expectations for a more effective collective security system, Bosnia dashed them. The United States initially deferred to the European powers for leadership in dealing with the violent breakup of Yugoslavia. The responses, largely limited to diplomacy and humanitarian relief operations, proved largely inadequate. For several years, the major powers could not reach a consensus on what, if any, military action was appropriate. In the case of the United States, this indecisiveness reflected splits within the administration and within Congress on how to deal with Bosnia. As a result, the UN, NATO, and the EU/WEU (European Union/Western European Union)--as well as the individual states--were for a long time largely ineffective in the face of aggression and ethnic cleansing.

Bosnia may represent a more typical problem than the Gulf War; if it does, the international community must improve its methods of dealing with conflict. The main problem appears to be the lack of political will and the absence of strong leadership, not a dearth of resources or military expertise. Furthermore, improving international institutions will matter little unless such improvements are coupled with a willingness among leaders to use available mechanisms and put new political and military strategies to work. [1]

The core issue is collective decision making about where, when, and how to use military force when traditional means of conflict resolution--negotiation, persuasion, diplomacy--are insufficient. Conventional wisdom holds that military force should be used only as a last resort. Too often, however, reserving force as a last resort allows genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other brutalities of war to devastate the lives of thousands of people in a region and further reduce the chances of resolving a conflict.

This report, which is based on an analysis of conflicts that have occurred since the establishment of the United Nations, seeks to contribute to collective planning and decision making; it derives some conclusions that may help political and military leaders in making difficult decisions. It assumes that the United Nations will not be empowered with a standing army or similar rapid reaction capability despite the perceived need for such a capability. If this continues to be true, then the development of alternative approaches is even more imperative. Indeed, even if the UN develops a modest force of brigade size along the lines of recent proposals, additional forces will no doubt be needed to complement the UN force in dealing with deadly conflicts. [2]

SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

Despite growing global interdependence, war remains a common feature of the international landscape, occurring among different national, ethnic, and religious communities unwilling to live together and settle their disputes peacefully. Although today's conflicts are often cloaked in the rhetoric of ethnic, religious and cultural dissent, for the most part, wars erupt over political power. The international community today faces some 40 unresolved conflicts (Table 1), about average for the post-Cold War era. While the end of the Cold War has reduced the risk of conflict between the major powers, it also removed some of the restraints that inhibited conflict. Although the United States and the Soviet Union are no longer fueling proxy wars in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, new wars are breaking out because the fear of superpower intervention has diminished.

Table 1. Unresolved Deadly Conflicts (January 1995) [3]

Africa	**Asia**	**Middle East**
Algeria Angola Burundi Egypt Kenya Liberia Mozambique Rwanda Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan	Afghanistan Bangladesh Burma Cambodia India Indonesia Pakistan Philippines Sri Lanka	Iran Iraq Israel Kuwait Lebanon Turkey Yemen
Europe	**Former Soviet Union**	**Americas**
Bosnia Croatia United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)	Azerbaijan Russia (Chechnya) Georgia Moldova Tajikistan	Colombia Guatemala Peru

Sources: Michael Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996; SIPRI Yearbook 1995, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 1995; Carter Center, State of the World Conflict Report 1994-95, Atlanta, 1995.

The conflicts are widely distributed, and the level of hostilities varies considerably. Most are smoldering conflicts, but at any one time intense fighting typically characterizes 5-10 cases. Although the vast majority of these conflicts primarily involve groups fighting within states, the distinction between internal and external conflict is becoming blurred: the loss of life and impact on neighboring states requires that the international community consider intervention in both cases. Multinational forces that are under the control of the UN, a regional security organization, or both, are involved in containing conflict in about 20 of these cases at any one time. For the most part, this involvement is limited to a peacekeeping role, after a cease-fire has been negotiated.

Outside military forces alone are unlikely to achieve lasting results in most of these conflicts--the recent recrudescence of mass violence in Liberia is clear evidence of this. The purpose of multinational forces is to stop the fighting and assist in bringing about a fair and lasting resolution of conflict, not to achieve a military victory. Therefore, multilateral military efforts should be a subordinate part of an overall campaign that includes diplomacy and humanitarian activities. The multinational forces must be prepared for combat, but their use must be designed to create conditions for a lasting peace. In most cases, they will need to support political and humanitarian efforts effectively. For these reasons, the subordination of multinational military operations to international political guidance is essential.

Given the wide scope and persistent nature of deadly conflict, extraordinary efforts are needed to reduce loss of life and ensure justice. Yet international cooperation is more difficult to achieve with struggling economies and without the kind of Cold War threats that imposed greater cohesion. This combination of developments presents a difficult challenge for national leaders who must establish and coordinate the kinds of multinational efforts needed in the new security environment.

2. MAKING THE CASE FOR USING MULTINATIONAL MILITARY FORCES

STRONG LEADERSHIP, important in any period, is essential in a time of major transition such as the aftermath of the Cold War. This transition has been characterized by a high degree of uncertainty in the international environment, which has contributed to a lack of public confidence in the foreign policies of many governments. In addition, the leaders of many of the major powers are in relatively weak domestic political positions. Under these conditions, exceptionally strong leadership is required to overcome the reluctance to use military force unless national security is directly threatened--and few states feel threatened by the types of conflicts listed in Table 1. Furthermore, most states configure their armed forces to deal with direct threats, so their forces are not well prepared to deal with these more remote problems.

In addition, many political leaders around the world doubt whether outside military involvement would be beneficial in most of these cases. Developing nations, particularly those that were under colonial rule, view foreign military intervention as a dangerous violation of national sovreignty that could lead to exploitation, even when the stated objective is to protect human life. Also, more advanced countries are reluctant to become involved because they will most likely be required to bear most of the costs. Furthermore, in more democratic countries, military

intervention will usually generate complex domestic debates about how resources are being allocated and whether a country's commitments abroad comport with the national interest. Few political leaders are willing to spend the political capital for such risky and controversial undertakings. Unless these conditions change, the prospects are low for multilateral military interventions beyond limited peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts, unless the national security of the intervening nations is threatened.

To make a persuasive case, national leaders who are considering involvement need a reasonably clear picture of the goals of any proposed operation and how it will be conducted. They also need to estimate the costs, risks, and likelihood of success. In so far as possible, they should estimate the duration of any proposed intervention. The prospects for generating support are enhanced when the burden is shared in a multilateral effort, especially if there is confidence in the effectiveness of the political control and military command arrangements. Also, approval of a proposed intervention by the UN Security Council adds a measure of legitimacy. Armed with a clear and compelling case and confidence in the principal institutions and commanders, national leaders will be better able to generate the necessary domestic support.

Military intervention would be easier to justify if states would make the gradual reduction of the overall level of conflict in the world an important part of their foreign policy agendas. [4] The consequences of inaction are clear: armed conflict devastates communities and the lives of individuals directly affected, creates refugees, disrupts international commerce, undermines international norms, and fosters regional and, in some cases, global instability. Thus, international efforts to deal with conflict should be viewed as having a bearing on national security. The crux of the issue is whether the values of democracy, human rights, and free market enterprise will be seen by the leaders of the more powerful nations as sufficient to invoke the commitments required, not for naive idealism, but enlightened self-interest. Countries that have taken a leading role in promoting peacekeeping, such as Canada, Ghana, and the Scandinavian countries, believe that preparing for conflict prevention and resolution now will have cumulative future benefits for the international community as a whole. The effectiveness of their efforts would be enhanced, however, if there were broader and more vigorous participation in conflict prevention efforts by other leading nations. The prospects for increased participation would be improved if confidence were increased in the ability of the international community to manage successful military interventions with limited losses.

3. MANAGING MULTINATIONAL FORCES

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY has three choices for managing multinational forces: the United Nations, a regional organization, or an *ad hoc* coalition. Whichever arrangement is chosen, it must provide an effective interface between the military commanders and the political leaders, including a mandate that defines the purpose, scope, and, possibly, the timeframe of the military operations. If the operation is to succeed, the management arrangement should provide

for unified operational control of the multinational forces and a cycle of supervision and response that includes regular feedback to the political leadership. It is vital that broad political objectives be translated by the commander into explicit military missions at the outset. Such mission statements provide the best basis for determining the composition of the forces. Unfortunately, too often multinational forces have been employed without carefully matching the ends and means. Participating forces are often selected for reasons of political balance and representation, rather than military effectiveness. As a result, multinational forces are often less than the sum of their parts and thus fall short of expectations.

MANAGEMENT CHOICES FOR MULTINATIONAL MILITARY FORCES

The task of welding disparate national contingents into an effective operating force is demanding, and it is probably only fully understood by those who have been a part of such an operation. Several models are available. The challenge is not easily or quickly met, and failure can produce disarray, confusion, and the appearance of incompetence. The media can seize on such developments and undermine confidence, harmony, and ultimately, the credibility of the operation. All three types of management arrangement--the UN, regional organizations, and *ad hoc* coalitions--need to anticipate these problems by building structures and procedures for coordinating multilateral military operations.

THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations is not a warfighting organization. [5] The main responsibility of the UN Security Council is the maintenance of international peace and security; in its efforts to carry out this role, it may authorize the use of multinational military forces. The Security Council is the ultimate source of legitimacy for any multilateral military operations. In addition, the secretary-general and his staff manage all UN peacekeeping operations in conjunction with the secretary-general's diplomatic role in conflict resolution. A special representative of the secretary-general is appointed to manage each specific operation. Because UN officials have gained considerable experience with peacekeeping and humanitarian aid missions over the past 50 years, new peacekeeping missions are able to draw on an experienced core of personnel in the critical initial phases of a deployment. Existing stand-by arrangements mean that, once a mission is mandated, response from traditional peacekeeping countries could, in theory, be fairly swift.

The UN has 185 member states to provide military or financial contributions. To date, however, the member states have been unwilling to provide the necessary resources for the UN to conduct operations with full effectiveness. There are various, and even antithetical, reasons for their reluctance. Several developing nations, for example, perceive the five permanent members of the Security Council as a wealthy nations club who act only in their own self-interest. On the other hand, the United States is seeking to reduce its assessment, which pays for more than 30 percent of the cost of peacekeeping operations. While these debates over resources continue, the

inadequacies of the present system have become painfully obvious as the number of deployments have more than doubled since 1989.

The UN does not have mechanisms in place for rapid deployment of peace-keeping forces, although improvements are being discussed. These mechanisms include prepositioned, prepackaged logistical supplies; adequate communications equipment; and organic transportation assets to get soldiers and supplies to the area of operations. At present, national contingents are expected to provide their own supplies for the first two to three months, until UN subcontracted logistics become available. Compounding these problems is a lack of baseline training and equipment standards for peacekeepers, who may thus be deployed without the minimum skills and equipment necessary to carry out the mandate.

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Many observers, including the secretary-general, have suggested that regional organizations (Table 2) should shoulder more of the responsibility for undertaking military operations. The threat is more immediate, and states bordering areas of conflict usually have a better understanding of the problem and the cultural context than other nations. Regional states also have better intelligence and shorter supply lines to support military operations. Despite these advantages, regional organizations have not been up to the task of limiting conflict. They generally suffer from the lack of national political will and the consequent lack of funding. Most are not organized to manage military operations, nor do they have the resources. In some areas, like the Middle East, there are no organizations that span the region and include all the states.

Highly developed capabilities, such as those of NATO, which were designed to meet massive military attacks from the East, are neither necessary nor likely to be available in most areas. But there are some modest steps at the regional level that could produce substantial improvements in the ability of multinational forces to deal with deadly conflicts, if called upon. Such steps would typically involve modest measures that can be carried out within a few years, without requiring substantial increases in expenditures. Combined planning and training are appropriate areas for early attention. For example, regional military training centers could be established using facilities that have become available with the downsizing of several national forces in Europe, the United States, and the former Soviet Union.

Within a region, different states could provide training for different roles. One noncontroversial role could be responding to natural disasters--a problem widely shared. These centers could build on the experience that many states have gained in dealing with floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, and fires. Another important but more controversial program could provide training to deal with nuclear incidents that result from either an accident with a nuclear reactor or the detonation of a nuclear weapon. If regional forces developed a quick and effective capability to respond to such incidents, then they also might serve to deter the threats or actual use of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups or rogue regimes. In the process of training together for these situations, the military forces of the region would improve their ability to function effectively as a team. NATO's Partnership for Peace provides one useful approach to expanding multinational training

and operations. Each partnership program is unique, but in general the focus is on joint missions that are in high demand, have worldwide application, and are easily digestible. These missions include peace operations such as monitoring cease-fires, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance.

Table 2. Regional and Subregional Organizations

Africa

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Economic Community of Central African States (ECOCAS) Southern African Development Community (SADC)

Americas

The Organization of American States (OAS) Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS)

Asia

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); ASEAN Regional Forum Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Partnership for Peace (PFP)

Europe and North Atlantic

European Union (EU) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Partnership for Peace (PFP) Western European Union (WEU) Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Middle East

Arab League (AL) Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) Arab Maghreb Union (UMA)

The concept of a regional training center could be tested in Panama using the facilities that are being vacated by the United States as part of the turnover of the Panama Canal. This center could operate under the auspices of the Organization of American States with the 35 member states sending troops for training on a regular rotational basis. The multilateral nature of the training

center would probably be more politically acceptable than a residual presence of U.S. forces after 1999 when the canal reverts to Panama. The multilateral military presence would also help offset the economic impact of the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

Contingency planning is another area in which the regional capability of multinational forces could be strengthened. National military staffs and war colleges could be encouraged to develop plans and strategies to address regional conflicts, and they should publish articles that offer insights into such conflict. Articles in military publications tend to focus on history or foreign technological developments, rather than present useful analysis of regional conflict. Regular military exchanges could compare alternative approaches for dealing with regional conflicts. In addition, simulations and war games involving both military and political leaders from several nations--including legislators--would be useful in developing insights and better understandings of the problems and building political consensus should actual intervention become necessary. Also, by involving high-level civilian officials, governments will develop more realistic understandings of what military forces can and cannot accomplish.

AD HOC COALITIONS

In certain cases, *ad hoc* coalitions are better than UN and regional command arrangements. Nations that form *ad hoc* coalitions identify themselves as concerned members of the international community with a genuine interest in preventing or halting instances of deadly conflict. Unity of command typically is achieved in these coalitions through the vesting of overall command in a leader and the core of his staff from the state contributing the most troops. Like-minded nations often possess interoperable equipment, easing logistical problems, and many will have already conducted bilateral and multilateral military exercises. The resulting shared knowledge of operating doctrine and procedures of coalition partners aids in mission planning and execution.

Almost without exception, *ad hoc* coalitions are initiated and supported by the great powers, thus ensuring material and financial support. Costs and tasks are shared among the coalition partners, thereby easing the financial burden and obviating the need for expensive and potentially controversial unilateral action. Also, if the coalition includes some of the major powers, the depth and quality of military resources often exceed those available in regional organizations. Such involvement, however, also has drawbacks. It can play to latent hostile legacies of colonialism and act as a lightning rod for nationalistic or xenophobic sentiments, as in Somalia.

The main operational price paid by *ad hoc* coalition members is the lack of binding ties between them. Sustained operations and mounting casualties may strain the bonds of the coalition, even though the overall strategic goal continues to keep nations unified. During the course of difficult peace operations, where the strategic goals are perhaps not as well articulated or understood, there is a constant danger of a coalition disintegrating under operational and national political pressures.

Other difficulties may be encountered. One is the lack of an established military structure, although in some cases, existing structures such as a NATO headquarters, may be used by "coalitions of the willing." And although coalition members may have joint training experience, the very descriptor *ad hoc* implies some degree of haste in organization. Coalition partners must create entire military organizational structures, including a general staff headquarters, if the mission is to succeed. An alternative is to rely extensively on the planning assets of one nation or, as mentioned, to borrow from a regional security organization. Regardless of the form of management, national military forces should be structured for international roles as well as for national defense. Additional military police units may be needed, for example, if the national forces are part of an operation that puts them in direct contact with civilian populations, an increasingly likely situation given the growing number of intrastate conflicts.

ROLES AND MISSIONS

Once arrangements are made to manage international forces, then specific roles must be determined. In general, roles fall into four categories: deterring unwanted behavior; if deterrence fails, compelling prescribed or responsive behavior, such as cessation of hostilities or withdrawal from occupied territory; conducting humanitarian relief operations; or providing noncoercive support to diplomatic efforts undertaken to resolve conflicts (see Table 3). These roles correspond to the stages of conflict, from incipient violence to large-scale open combat. The life-cycle of conflicts is often not linear, progressing through stages; rather, they move back and forth between stages of relative peace and more intense fighting. Over the years, the UN has authorized operations of all these types, but it has been involved in managing only the humanitarian and noncoercive operations. Regional organizations and *ad hoc* coalitions have managed the full range of military operations. For the prevention of deadly conflict, deterrence would seem to be the most important role for multilateral military forces. However, it also is the role that they play least often.

Table 3. Roles and Missions for Multinational Forces

Deter Unwanted Behavior	**Humanitarian Relief**
Provide early warning Deter infiltration, aggression Maintain territorial integrity, political independence	Protect relief operations Provide emergency relief from natural disasters (medical, shelter, power, etc.) Conduct relief operations (convoys,air drops)
Compel Prescribed Behavior	**Noncoercive Support**
Create safe havens, weapons-free zones Disarm, demobilize local forces Deny combatants freedom of movement Remove "rogue" leaders	Establish buffer zone between combatants Monitor cease-fire; investigate violations Patrol borders Supervise prisoner exchanges

Locate, detain war criminals Conduct punitive strikes Enforce economic, arms embargo Secure withdrawal of foreign forces, advisors, mercenaries, paramilitaries Liberate seized territory Restore government; provide security Dismantle, destroy arms inventories and production facilities	Monitor disengagement, withdrawal of forces Clear minefields Provide security for elections Assist in restoring law and order Support rebuilding of infrastructure

The size, composition, and operational mission of a committed force must be determined by the purpose and the tasks to be performed. If the role of the multinational force changes, then the composition of the force must be reevaluated to ensure that the forces are adequate for the new tasks.

During the course of this study, we identified 26 types of military mission with which multinational forces have been tasked; in Table 3 we group them according to the roles with which they were most commonly associated. In some cases, similar missions were undertaken for different roles. By comparing Table 3 with Table 1, one can readily see that multinational military forces have been used most often to limit conflict or to mitigate the effects of conflict. Only rarely does the use of force by itself resolve conflict. Ultimately, a political settlement is necessary to achieve a lasting peace.

4. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

- Rapid Deployment
- Command and Control
- Intelligence
- Logistics

REGARDLESS of the arrangement chosen to manage multinational military forces, military operations involve several prerequisites. Particularly important are rapid deployment, command and control, intelligence, and logistics.

RAPID DEPLOYMENT

The time it takes to deploy forces must be shortened if there is to be maximum chance of success at minimum cost. A fundamental and recurring problem in recent multilateral operations has been the proclivity of states to delay taking action. This delay has occurred for many reasons, such as ambivalence about interfering in the internal matters of a sovereign state, lack of political

will, uncertainty about public opinion, and questions about whether the crisis at hand poses a direct or sufficient threat to national interests.

Under the current system, when the UN Security Council passes a resolution calling for the creation and deployment of a military force to provide assistance in a crisis, the request for troops and materiel goes to individual governments, which must then consider the proposal. For peacekeeping operations, in 1993 the UN implemented the UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS),[6] a database intended to speed up the process of troop contributions. However, deliberation at the national level can still add weeks or months to the troop deployment process. In addition, the UN has a bureaucracy of its own that involves submitting a proposed budget to the intergovernmental Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly. Six to eight weeks later, the requests are passed on to prospective donors, who have thirty days to respond. In reality, however, prospective donors usually respond in about ninety days, by which time, about half the money, troops, and equipment needed has usually been contributed. The UN is attempting to resolve chronic shortfalls in the peacekeeping budget and to establish equipment stockpiles and training facilities to accelerate the deployment process.

Several proposals to create a UN rapid reaction capability that would operate at the behest of the Security Council have been offered in an effort to avoid the delays created by national consideration of UN resolutions. It is argued that a UN brigade, for example, composed of troops stationed and trained on a permanent or rotating basis under the UN, would be immediately available for military operations.[7] This assumes that national governments would agree in advance to placing some of their soldiers at the Security Council's disposal or that individual military volunteers would be recruited for UN service. A UN rapid reaction capability of even modest size would be a useful additional tool for dealing with deadly conflicts. Yet, even if such a force is eventually established, there will continue to be a need for additional, more robust, multilateral forces to back up the initial deployment of UN forces or to act in other cases when the UN force is already fully engaged.

In addition to timeliness, multinational forces must be adequate to the task. The number and composition of the forces should be based on the mission and the situation they are likely to encounter. In Namibia and several other cases, multinational forces were pared down considerably from initial estimates of what would be required to do the job in order to hold down the costs. In other cases, multinational forces are so scaled back that they do not pose a direct threat to the belligerents. In most cases, it would be better to deploy a robust, fully capable force and limit the objectives of this force, rather than limit the capabilities of the force.[8] In whatever configuration and however rapidly the forces are deployed, they are not likely to be effective unless they are adequately staffed and supported in three key areas: command and control, intelligence, and logistics.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and control is the vital link between the leadership and the troops. It constitutes the analysis, planning, decision making, and communications necessary to direct military operations. It also involves distinct functions for the different levels of command (Table 4). With a clear hierarchical distinction of functions, any tendency to micromanage may be avoided.

The effectiveness of command and control is mainly a function of the quality and teamwork of the headquarters staff--and both of these are far more difficult to achieve when dealing with a collection of multinational forces. A unified effort should be the aim of the command and control arrangements, for without such a unified effort, the military operations are likely to be scattered and indecisive.

Since the military operations are only one part of a larger undertaking to achieve a lasting peace, a well-integrated campaign plan that fits the overall effort is essential. The campaign plan must clearly delineate the desired end state and the interim objectives for all political, military, and humanitarian activities. Also, appropriate coordinating mechanisms--for example, regularly scheduled meetings of key responsible officials--should be specified. Coordination with nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations is necessary to achieve a unified effect even though these organizations are not under the same operational control. Furthermore, it must be expected that the different methods of operation and the different priorities of these groups, along with the subordination of military forces to civil requirements, will complicate the command and control picture.

Notably absent in the planning and conduct of UN operations is a capable general staff headquarters. As a result, UN military operations have often had serious command and control problems. In 1994, for example, UNPROFOR'S headquarters staff was brought together for the first time just days before troops were deployed to the former Yugoslavia. In that time, they had to create operations orders and deployment timetables, with only a sketch of what military assets might be available. In Somalia, when the United States transferred its task force responsibilities to the UN's UNOSOM in 1993, only 25 percent of the UN staff was assembled.

NATO's recent efforts to establish a model Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) could be an important step for providing effective control of multinational forces. The CJTF could draw on a wealth of NATO experience, including the Allied Command Europe's (ACE) Mobile Force. The CJTF, once created, could be used to control a wide variety of military operations, including those conducted under the auspices of the UN, the WEU, or other organizations. Other regional organizations that wish to equip themselves to use multinational forces to deal with deadly conflicts would be well advised to adopt similar command and control arrangements and thereby improve their capability for collective military action.

Table 4. Command and Control: The Hierarchy of Direction

Political Direction

Sets policy objectives
Defines end conditions
Provides basic guidance, including rules of engagement

Strategic Direction

Develops basic strategy to achieve objectives
Establishes campaign purposes and sequencing

Operational Direction

Orchestrates units, logistics, intelligence, and other support

Tactical Direction

Directs units engaged in operations

Source: Lt. Gen. John H. Cushman, USA ret., Thoughts for Joint Commanders, Annapolis, Maryland, 1993, p. 6.

INTELLIGENCE

Military operations are blind without timely and accurate information. Unfortunately, intelligence support has been a major weakness of most multinational military operations. There is an inherent reluctance to share intelligence because it originates from national organizations that go to great lengths to protect their information, their sources, and their methods. In addition, the UN has avoided even using the term--preferring "information"--because of the negative connotations associated with intelligence. The UN and regional organizations do not want to be tarnished as spy organizations.

Nevertheless, military planners and commanders need strategic and tactical intelligence. They need to understand the political and economic context of the conflict as well as the tactical situation. They need to be able to acquire and analyze information and reach decisions before their efforts can be preempted by opposing forces. Initial operational planning must ensure intelligence support from many national sources.

LOGISTICS

Military operations cannot be conducted without the full range of logistics support--including airlift, sealift, prepositioned stocks, combat support (CS), and combat service support.[9] Providing logistics support for multinational forces is particularly difficult because of differences in

equipment and procedures. Given the importance and complexity of logistics support, it must be included in all operational planning and must constitute a part of the initial deployment. Detailed information is required about the local infrastructure, including water, power, and fuel supplies and transportation systems, ports, and airfields; information about health and other conditions that may affect military operations is also needed. Logistics has traditionally been a national responsibility in multilateral military operations, even in NATO. Only the UN has established a basic international military logistics system.

The UN and the United States are increasingly turning to commercial contractors to provide these services. In part this is a result of downsizing and elimination of logistics units. In Haiti, for example, contractors quickly constructed and maintained four large military base camps for the American forces. In many cases, supplies can be purchased locally at considerable savings in time and transportation costs. In doing so, care must be taken that these purchases do not disrupt the local economy. In most cases, incorporating contractor support into contingency planning and operations can provide the necessary support in a timely and efficient manner.

5. THE USE OF FORCE--WHEN, WHY, AND HOW

IN GENERAL, there has been too little thinking about when, why, and how to use military force for purposes other than national defense. Governments too often wait until they are confronted with a crisis, and then it becomes largely a matter of choosing among several unattractive options. Furthermore, it has not been politically correct to encourage such thinking in many countries. Nevertheless, a wider dialogue is needed so that consensus can more easily be achieved when the need arises. Key issues in such a dialogue should include how to reach more timely collective decisions, choosing the nature of military interventions, reform of peacekeeping doctrine, and the issue of impartiality.

THE NEED FOR EARLY DECISION

To be more successful in dealing with deadly conflict, the international community needs to address problems much earlier than has been the pattern over the last fifty years. Intuitively, we recognize that it is usually better to deal with problems early. By addressing little problems upstream, we may hope to prevent them from becoming bigger problems later. It must also be recognized, however, that early military intervention would go against conventional thinking that force should be used only as a last resort. Conflicts over the past five decades clearly indicate that military intervention can usually forestall mass violence and that acting too late in a crisis is costly, both in terms of lives and resources and in terms of postconflict recovery. On the other

hand, some conflicts are made worse by the use of outside military forces. Collective political and military judgment must make the distinction.

In retrospect, history is replete with examples when early action by the international community might have prevented much that followed--Hitler's uncontested reoccupation of the demilitarized Rhineland in 1936, for example. More recently, during the incipient phases of the breakup of Yugoslavia, there were numerous calls for preventive troop deployments. During the Rwandan massacres, the secretary-general campaigned for months before countries were willing to commit resources. The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh lacked an international force that both Armenia and Azerbaijan would have welcomed to help preserve a cease-fire. And in Burundi, large-scale killings and mass migrations could probably have been prevented if some countries had sent additional forces to the region.

TOWARD A MIDDLE GROUND

Between doing nothing and employing overwhelming force in a decisive manner, there is a middle ground that deserves far more attention by the international community. This middle ground would involve a more modest use of international force in a limited but persistent manner that would raise the costs substantially to an aggressor or a group that grossly violates human rights. This could involve punitive air strikes or aggressive blockades, for example, in which casualties to the multinational force would be minimized. While such interventions would not be likely to have an immediate impact, their cumulative effect could be decisive.[10]

Doing nothing is one consequence of several efforts to establish criteria for military intervention. In most cases, the criteria are so stringent--involving vital national interests--that states would not join in a collective security effort unless they were directly attacked. For example, the "Weinberger Criteria" espoused by the U.S. secretary of defense in 1984, argued that the United States should engage in conflict only if vital national interests or the vital interests of allies are at stake; forces are commensurate with stated political objectives; the military and political objectives are clear; each contingency includes ongoing monitoring and adjustment to ensure that military capabilities match the political objectives; the public and Congress support military intervention before U.S. troops are deployed; and force is the last resort.[11] More recently, President Clinton approved a directive that establishes seven factors to consider for U.S. participation in international peacekeeping operations.[12]

While the adoption of some general considerations for the use of force can help prevent hasty, unwise decisions, the belief that such criteria will be rigidly adhered to may lead future Saddam Husseins to believe that nothing short of self-defense will stir the international community to action. If international forces are to prevent deadly conflict, they must be able to deter unwanted behavior, and deterrence requires presenting a credible threat.

RETHINKING PEACEKEEPING

During the Cold War, deterrence was largely limited to the East-West competition, and the UN was prevented from developing the robust kinds of military capabilities that many had originally envisioned in the Charter. As an alternative, the UN developed the concept of "peacekeeping,"[13] which led to the development of distinct doctrines, training, and national force postures related to that purpose. As a result, the international community's military resources to a significant degree are focused not on the prevention of deadly conflict, but only on the final phases of conflict, and then only after a cease-fire agreement has been reached. This, of course, assumes that some share of the military forces of the several states will be available for international missions even when direct threats to national security are absent.

The concept of peacekeeping also results in constraining the use of military forces to the point where they can be effective only with the cooperation of the belligerents. In some cases, troops have been selected for peacekeeping missions primarily for political reasons, including the approval of the belligerents, not for their military effectiveness. In some cases, troops were not trained or equipped to deal with conflict. Improperly prepared peacekeeping forces suffer unnecessary casualties, conflict is not contained, and confidence in the United Nations is undermined.[14] The result of all this is increased reluctance among nations to place their forces under UN command. It has emboldened local militants to attack UN peacekeepers in some cases and to take them hostage in others. There is therefore good reason to believe that international forces, contrary to the prevailing UN doctrine, should be capable of conducting a full range of military missions, including combat, so that they may be used at any stage during the life cycle of a conflict.

A well-thought-out international doctrine is needed for peace enforcement operations. Even though the goal is conflict resolution, or at least conflict termination, some level of force is likely to be needed in most cases. When and if needed, multinational military force should be used with restraint and should be applied prudently, and positive measures should be taken to avoid unintended damage. However, because the use of force can also lead to retaliation against humanitarian or other unprotected personnel, the circumstances need to be carefully considered. Nevertheless, the entire operation cannot allow itself to be intimidated by hostage taking or other threats by the belligerents. These and other problems should be identified in peace enforcement doctrines, devised and articulated by the UN, regional organizations, and other collective military organizations. This, in turn, would help policymakers to anticipate the likely consequences of their decisions. In particular, the doctrine should alert leaders to the dangers of mission creep, which occurs when the forces take on roles beyond those specified in their original mission. When this happens, the assigned forces may not be appropriately configured for the new roles.

THE LIMITS OF IMPARTIALITY

Impartiality, when too rigidly applied, can become an excuse for inaction. Strict impartiality has resulted in passive responses to genocide, ethnic cleansing, and widespread use of rape as a

weapon of war. It also has, at times, limited the UN's options and frustrated many of the military and political figures who have tried to settle disputes. Although interventions by the international community must be broadly viewed as fair in order to maintain legitimacy, there should be clearly marked boundaries beyond which groups cannot go without receiving swift and certain punishment from the international community.

Free from overly rigid constraints on international action, the UN or interested governments can conduct diplomacy backed up by the credible use of force and may thereby bring the belligerents to the negotiating table sooner than if they had no consequences to face from the international community. In addition, given the nature of post-Cold War conflict--often intrastate, with severe consequences for one or more ethnic or religious minorities--a posture of impartiality as a prerequisite for engagement may prevent international action at the early stages of a conflict.

Too strict a requirement for impartiality would restrict the range of military missions that could be undertaken to prevent or suppress deadly conflict. In fact, it is questionable whether any international involvement in a conflict can be wholly impartial, whether in intention or effect.[15] In the former Yugoslavia, for example, the arms embargo, which was supposed to affect all warring parties equally, favored the Serbs because there was no way to ensure complete and equal enforcement by neighboring states. Similarly in Somalia, when international mediators began talks with the disputants, there was a decisive shift in the relative power of local warlords just by virtue of who was chosen to participate and who was not. While impartiality is a useful principle, its blind implementation may produce violations of other important principles, such as preventing the loss of life. In such cases, the international community should not be immobilized by a requirement to be impartial.

Dialogue on these and similar issues related to the use of multinational military forces would enhance the ability of the international community to deal with actual and potential instances of mass violence. The dialogue should include national governments and international organizations, regardless of who is responsible for the management of military interventions.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

THE MORE EFFECTIVE USE of multinational military forces to deal with deadly conflict will depend on how well we learn the lessons from previous efforts.[16] A brief comparison of earlier conflicts and current hostilities suggests that decisions to use force will continue to be extraordinarily difficult for national leaders both individually and collectively. This burden can be lightened somewhat by increasing their confidence in the ability of the international community to manage the use of force effectively. This, in turn, will require fresh thinking on

the use of force and the adoption of specific mechanisms to address the many shortcomings identified in the growing literature on previous military interventions.

Our contribution to this fresh thinking is to suggest some changes for all three types of management arrangement.

THE UNITED NATIONS

- Comprehensive contingency planning for the use of military forces should be undertaken by the UN in conjunction with regional organizations and coalitions. This planning should consider distinct but coupled phases of military operations, including deterrence, persuasion, humanitarian relief, and peacekeeping. The UN should manage peacekeeping operations involving observers and buffer forces in both the deterrence and peacekeeping phases. If and when needed, the regional organization or coalition should manage military operations aimed at compulsion. Contingency planning should also include techniques for handing off operations from coalitions or other organizations to the UN or vice versa.
- Improvements in rapid deployment and logistical support of forces, including greater utilization of commercial contracting, also would be beneficial.

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

- Persistent efforts should be made by political leaders to engage these organizations in discussions of ways of reducing the level of violence in their regions. These discussions should include the possibility of using multinational forces.
- Regional organizations that have responsibility for collective security within their charter should develop appropriate political-military interfaces to manage multinational military operations. nato's North Atlantic Council is a useful model. Also, a skeleton military headquarters and staff would improve the capacity of regional organizations to respond if the organization decides to employ forces.
- In most areas, highly developed capabilities such as those of NATO are neither necessary nor likely to be available. There are, however, some modest steps that could be taken to enhance capabilities for the use of multinational forces within a few years, and without substantial increases in expenditures. In some areas, regional military training centers could be established where facilities have become available with the downsizing of several national forces. The Organization of American States could use excess military facilities in Panama, for example. One uncontroversial role that such centers could play could be responding to natural disasters--a problem widely shared. These centers could build on the experience that many states have gained in dealing with floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, and fires. In the process of training for these situations, the military forces would improve their ability to function effectively as a team.

AD HOC COALITIONS

- More widespread sharing of national analyses of conflicts and of the costs, risks, and benefits of using military forces would be useful. These exchanges should help inform debate on when and how multinational forces should be employed.
- At the national level, leaders should seek to expand foreign policy objectives to include reducing the level of international violence. Unless leaders mobilize their countries to become involved in efforts to prevent or contain deadly conflict, all the efforts to improve the capacity of the international community to deal with deadly conflict will ultimately be of little use.
- National force structures may need to be adjusted to deal more effectively with foreign internal conflicts. For example, additional military police units may be needed as military forces become increasingly involved with operations that put them into direct contact with civilian populations on a regular basis.

KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION

For any serious military intervention, political and military leaders need to anticipate a wide range of issues. The considerations include:

- Determining the nature of deadly conflict. What is the problem? For example, stopping ethnic conflict or reversing a cross-border invasion.
- Judging the timing and the cost and benefits of early intervention versus waiting. If current trends continue, will the conflict become more deadly and intractable?
- Defining a successful outcome and assessing the likelihood of success.
- Clarifying expectations of costs, casualties, duration, phasing, method of terminating military involvement, and transition to the UN or another organization.
- Estimating expectations of public and parliamentary support. What *should* the public be willing to bear? What is the likelihood that national leaders can mobilize public support? Can public support be sustained?
- Determining the locus of authority over forces; provisions for political-military interface between the military chain of command and higher civilian direction.
- Mandating the terms of employment; including the selected modes of intervention and military tasks, along with missions, operational objectives, and any specific rules of engagement.
- Determining the size and composition of the multinational force and any special capabilities or limitations.
- Arranging support requirements for the selected mode of intervention, including headquarters staff, plans, intelligence, logistics, training, and exercises.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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1. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (A/47/277-S/24111), para. 6.

2. Sir Brian Urquhart has written several articles on the potential benefits of a UN rapid response capability. See, for example, the *New York Review of Books*, May 12, 1994, pp. 29-34.

3. "Deadly conflict" is a civil or international conflict in which the opponents are both armed and organized and in which more than 1,000 people have been killed. "Unresolved" means that the opponents have not yet agreed to a settlement.

4. Jonathan Dean, unpublished paper, "Peacekeeping and U.S. National Security," December 6, 1994, p. 5.

5. Giandomenico Pico provides insight into the division of labor at the UN in his article, "The UN and the Use of Force: Leave the Secretary General Out of It," in *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1994, pp. 14-18.

6. This database stores information on national military capabilities. Specifically, it is designed to report on troops that can be readily deployed for UN missions.

7. The Dutch government has put forth an unpublished proposal on creating a UN brigade that would draw on member states' armies to staff a rotating force of 5,000 troops (*A Rapid Deployment Brigade: A Preliminary Study*, January 1995).

8. Ambassador Charles Freeman, formerly at the United States Institute of Peace, has elaborated this idea.

9. "Combat support" includes engineer, signal, chemical, military police, intelligence, civil affairs, psychological operations, and aviation specialties. "Combat service support" includes quartermaster (supply and services), ordnance (ammunition and maintenance), transportation, finance, legal, personnel, and medical services.

10. Edward Luttwak develops a similar notion in his article, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," in *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1995, pp. 109-122.

11. For the complete text and analysis of the principles, see Alan Ned Sabrosky and Robert L. Sloane, eds., *The Recourse to War: An Appraisal of the "Weinberger Doctrine"* (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1988). See also Christopher Gacek, *The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

12. See "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, PDD-25," Department of State Publication 10161, May 1994. For an explanation of President Clinton's shift to a cautious policy on U.S. participation in peacekeeping, see Mats R. Berdal, "Fateful Encounter: The United States and UN Peacekeeping," *Survival*, vol. 36 (Spring 1994), pp. 30-50.

13. "Peacekeeping" refers to the use of military personnel without enforcement powers in operations undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security. In practice, such operations are usually undertaken only with the consent of the parties to the conflict. Impartiality is also a fundamental requirement for such operations, and the peacekeepers' use of force is limited to self-defense, as a last resort. This means that if any

belligerents choose not to cooperate, they can defy a peacekeeping operation [United Nations, *The Blue Helmets* (second edition, 1990), pp. 4, 5, 6].

14. On several occasions, UN troops have suffered from lack of proper equipment. In 1994, several Bangladeshi peacekeepers froze to death in Bosnia because they were not properly clad and did not have the firepower to escape the Serb siege. In Somalia, mechanized forces were not available to rescue trapped U.S. rangers.

15. Richard K. Betts addresses this question in "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention, "*Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1994, pp. 20-33.

16. See Boutros-Ghali's *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, A/50/60, S/1995/1, 3 January 1995 (New York: United Nations).

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Richard Solomon
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James Gustave Speth
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