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Islam: A Mosaic, Not a Monolith

President's Essay — From the 2001 Annual Report

by Vartan Gregorian

Although more than a year has passed since the attacks of September 11, 2001, most Americans still have such a sketchy knowledge of Islam that we probably need to keep ourselves focused on President George W. Bush’s repeated reminders that terrorists, not Muslims or Arabs, are the enemy. That reasoned message, however, is often drowned out by noisy ones from some Muslim clerics who call America the “Great Satan” and some political theorists who interpret the war cries of some militant Islamists as the start of a “clash of civilizations.”1 Provocative messages always gain a disproportionate amount of public attention, but they must be carefully considered and put in context, especially in the aftermath of September 11.

It will surprise many Americans that Islam is the world’s and America’s fastest-growing religion. It continues to grow at a rate faster than that of the world’s population. If current trends continue, according to some estimates, it will have more adherents by the year 2023 than any other.

Most Americans tend to think of Islam as exclusively a religion of Arabs. But Muslims are as diverse as humanity itself, representing one in five people in the world. Only 15 percent of the world’s 1.2 billion Muslims are Arabs, while nearly one in three Muslims lives on the Indian subcontinent. The largest Muslim nation is Indonesia, with 160 million Muslims among its 200 million people. Muslims represent the majority population in more than 50 nations, and they also constitute important minorities in many other countries. Muslims comprise at least 10 percent of the Russian Federation’s population, 3 percent of China’s population and 3 to 4 percent of Europe’s population. Islam is the second largest religion in France and the third largest in both Germany and Great Britain. Although estimates vary widely, Muslims represent 1 or 2 percent of the United States population, and some say there are more Muslims than Jews or Episcopalians in America. Religious, cultural and population centers for Muslims, then, are no longer limited to such places as Mecca, Cairo, Baghdad, Teheran, Islamabad, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Fez and Damascus—they also include Paris, Berlin, London and now New York, Detroit, Los Angeles and Washington, D.C.2

Many Americans do not know that there are Christian Arabs as well as Muslim Arabs. Indeed, some of the oldest Christian churches—including the Coptic Orthodox, Jacobite and Maronite churches—rose, functioned, and still do, in Arab countries.

Given America’s role as a magnet for immigrants, it is not surprising that the United States is one of the best reflections of Muslim diversity. “It is of the greatest interest and significance that the Muslim umma, or community, of North America is as nearly a microcosm of the global umma as has ever occurred since Islam became a major religion,” writes Lawrence H. Mamiya.3 American Muslims bring a rich ethnic heritage from South Asian countries such as India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan; Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines; all Arab nations, Iran and Turkey. American Muslims also add their African, Caribbean and European heritage to the nation’s mix.4

With the United States currently being the world’s sole military and economic superpower, I believe that we as a society have a responsibility—for our own sake as well as for others’—to know the complex nature of the world, its incredibly rich variety of races, nations, tribes, languages, economies, cultures and religions. Today, of course, Islam has become one of the major topics of discussion and controversy in the United States and elsewhere. Yet there is a disconnection between our passions about Islam and our knowledge of it.

It has become essential for us to understand Islam as a religion, its unity, diversity and culture—and to appreciate the legacy of Islamic civilizations, their role in the development of modern civilizations, the roles of Muslim nations and the challenges they face, and their future place and role in the world. Of course, this is much easier said than done, especially because in America today there is unfortunately no deep national commitment to history and heritage—not our own, and certainly not that of the world at large.

A Survey of Islam

To understand Islam, one has to appreciate the central role of Prophet Muhammad ibn Abdallah (570–632) in the formation and propagation of Islam as a religion. Muhammad was an Arab merchant, respected and wealthy, who belonged to the Qureish tribe in Mecca, then a great trading and religious center of pagan Arabia. His father had died before his birth, and his mother died in his early childhood. He was brought up by his grandfather and, after his death, by his uncle, Abu Talib, whose son Ali ibn Abi Talib became the Prophet’s first disciple and later his son-in-law.

Muslims believe that Muhammad, following God’s instructions through the Archangel Gabriel, called humanity to a faith acknowledging Allah. Contrary to what many believe, Allah was not a new god, but simply the Arabic word for God—the God of Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad. According to Muslim tradition, the Prophet Muhammad brought a message of continuity with Judaism and Christianity to the polytheistic tribes of Arabia. His message was an uncompromising, non-idolatrous monotheism. The faith was Islam, the Arabic verb meaning “surrender” or “submission,” as in surrendering to God’s will. (Qur’an: “With God, the religion is Islam” and “It is a cult of your father, Abraham. He was the one who named you Muslims.”)5 Muslim is the active participle of the verb islam, meaning “I surrender.”

In 622, having challenged the polytheist practices in Mecca, Muhammad fled for safety to Yatrib, subsequently named Medina, the City of the Prophet. This event, called the Hijra, marks the start of the Islamic era and of the Islamic calendar—2002 a.d. is 1423 a.h. or Anno Hegirae, the Year of the Hijra.I

Islam, like Judaism and Christianity, is a prophetic religion. It, too, emphasizes God’s relationship to humanity and reveals God’s will through the medium of prophets—with warnings of punishment that will befall those who reject the divine message or are guilty of the cardinal sin of idolatry. (The Qur’an: “Say ye: we believe in Allah, and the revelation given to us, and to Abraham, Ismail, Isaac, Jacob, and all the tribes. And, to that given to Moses and Jesus, and that given to [all] prophets from their Lord. We make no difference between one and another of them.”)6

Muslims believe that the Prophet Muhammad received divine revelations from 610, starting in the ninth lunar month, Ramadan, until his death in 632 and that these oracles were transcribed during his lifetime and, within subsequent decades, were officially collected in the Qur’an, from the Arabic verb qara’a, meaning to recite, read or transmit. The Qur’an, which Muslims consider to be a supernatural text, has 114 chapters, suras, of varying lengths, from 3 to 286 lines, and they are arranged not in chronological or narrative order, but rather by their length, with the longest chapter near the beginning and the shortest chapter last.7 Many non-Muslims will be surprised, on reading the Qur’an, to see the numerous references to biblical stories and figures. Writing about the universality of the Qur’an, the scholar Mohamed Talbi refers to a saying attributed to the Prophet Muhammad that the Qur’an is “God’s Banquet,” to which everyone is invited, but not obligated to attend—people should come to him out of love, not compulsion.II Muslims consider the Qur’an to be the revealed and eternal Word of God and believe that the Qur’an “completes and perfects” the revelations given to earlier prophets, including Moses and Jesus. Muslims maintain that Muhammad was the greatest prophet and that he was the last one.

Muslims also believe that since God spoke to Muhammad through the Archangel Gabriel in Arabic, translations of the Qur’an are hence considered to be mere “interpretations.” Even though the vast majority of Muslims do not understand Arabic, only the original Arabic is used in Muslim prayers in the belief that the faithful can experience the presence of God by reading the Qur’an aloud. Some of the oldest surviving copies of the Qur’an apparently date from the start of the eighth century, but more than a thousand years passed before questions of spelling, structure of the text and rules for reading were finally formalized with its publication in Cairo between 1919 and 1928.8

The fundamental principles of Islam are Towhid, unity of God; Nowbowat, belief in the prophetic mission of Muhammad; and Ma’ad, belief in the day of judgment and resurrection. In addition, Islam has five cardinal tenets, called the Pillars of Faith, which all Muslims must observe. They must:

  • bear witness, Shihada, that “there is no God but God, and Muhammad is his Prophet.”
  • pray five times a day as a regular reminder of their commitment to Islam. To symbolize the unity of the faithful, the earliest Muslims oriented their prayers toward Jerusalem and, later on, toward Mecca. Muslims must prostrate themselves in prayer, repeatedly touching their foreheads to the ground, to dispel arrogance and promote humility.
  • give a portion of their income as tax, zakat, and one-fifth of their income, khoums, to the poor. The zakat, meaning “purification,” is based on the concept that a society cannot be pure as long as there is hunger and misery.
  • fast during the day for the whole month of Ramadan to experience hunger—that most visceral suffering of the poor.
  • make at least one pilgrimage to Mecca, if physically and financially able.

In addition to the Qur’an and its Five Pillars, the study of Prophet Muhammad’s life, known as the sunna, became a part of the Islamic faith, law and theology. This occurred because Muhammad was considered to be the Perfect Man, and though he was not deemed divine, his life eventually became a source of inspiration and a guide to practicing Muslims. “By imitating the smallest details of his external life and by reproducing the way he ate, washed, loved, spoke and prayed, Muslims hoped to be able to acquire his interior attitude of perfect surrender to God,” writes Karen Armstrong.9

The sunna, the oral history of the Prophet, is the second most important source of Islamic law, after the Qur’an. The third source is the hadith, which consists of thousands of references to Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and teachings that are documented through a reconstructed, uninterrupted chain of people, traced to his immediate family and entourage. The entire body of Islamic law is called the Sharia, or “the straight path to God.” The Sharia has five main sources: the Qur’an, the sunna, the hadith, legal analogies based on the Qur’an and the hadith, and legal decisions that arise from consensus, in the belief that God would not allow the whole community to go astray.10(Some strict schools of Islamic law do not accord the latter two sources or even the hadith much weight.)

The Qur’an singles out Jews and Christians as “People of the Book” and sets them apart from non-believers. After all, Jews and Christians, like Muslims, worshiped the transcendent God of Abraham. But the “Book” mentioned is not the Bible; it refers to a heavenly text, written by God, of which the Qur’an, according to Muslims, is the only perfect manifestation.11

As in Judaism and Christianity, Abraham, Ibrahim, occupies a central place in Islam. Abraham is at the root of all three religions: just as Jews trace their lineage to Abraham and his wife, Sarah, through their son, Isaac, the Arabs trace their genealogy to Abraham and Hagar—Sarah’s Egyptian maid—through their son, Ishmael.12 In the Qur’an, Abraham is recognized as the first Muslim because he surrendered to God rather than accept the idolatrous religion of his parents. There are more than 60 references to Abraham in the Qur’an, and he is called Hanif, a “True Monotheist,” Khalil, a “Friend of God,” and even Umma, “Muslim community,” for initially he was the entire faith community. In every Muslim prayer, Ibrahim is mentioned.13 Muslims believe that it was Abraham and Ishmael, Ismail, who rebuilt Islam’s holiest shrine in Mecca—the Kaaba, believed to be the oldest monotheistic temple, which some Muslim traditions trace to Adam. The cube-shaped Kaaba is made of stone and marble, and its interior contains pillars and silver and gold lamps; it is entered only twice a year for a ritual cleansing ceremony.14

Moses is also considered to be a great prophet. His confrontation with the Egyptian pharaoh, his miracles in the desert and his ascension to the mountain to receive God’s commandments are all acknowledged in the Qur’an.15

For Muslims, Jesus, Isa, is a great prophet and messenger of God—the promised Messiah who brought “the Word of God and Spirit from Him.” Jesus is considered the son of the “sinless” Virgin Mary, Maryam, who is mentioned more often in the Qur’an than in the Bible.16 Muslims believe that Jesus preached the Word of God and worked miracles; but like Jews, Muslims reject the Christian concept of Jesus as the divine son of God. Muslims consider that blasphemy, for they believe there is only one divinity, God. The crucifixion of Christ is mentioned in passing only, and the Qur’an states that Jesus did not die, but was rescued by God and taken to heaven.17 In the end, Jesus and other prophets will descend to be at the final judgment. Muslims also believe that Jesus’ true message had to have been distorted by his followers and that the Prophet Muhammad was sent to bring the definitive message of God.18

Of course, there are many important similarities and differences among the religions. To mention just a few more: Jews don’t accept the New Testament, but Muslims do. The miracles of Jesus, his virgin birth and his second coming are accepted in Islam, but not in Judaism. Both Judaism and Islam put great importance on living according to a system of law—for Jews, the law is the Halakhah; for Muslims it is the Sharia.19 In Christianity, which has the concept of original sin, humans are born as sinners; but in both Judaism and Islam, sin is not present at birth and accrues only through sinful activity. Both Judaism and Islam share similar dietary restrictions, including bans on eating pork or blood, though the Islamic rules are generally less restrictive than Judaism’s.20 And, as with Christian and Jewish children, Muslim children are freely given biblical names: Solomons and Sulaimans, Sarahs and Sirahs, Josephs and Yusufs, Marys and Maryams, Jesuses and Isas, Johns and Yahyas, and Davids and Davuds, to cite a few.

The Phenomenal Spread of Islam

The early spread of Islam is one of the most dramatic chapters in all history. By 632, when Islam was only decades old and just solidifying into a religion, almost all the tribes of Arabia had converted to Islam or joined Prophet Muhammad’s confederacy. Within less than a century of Islam’s birth, the Muslim community had grown by conquest into one of the largest empires—one that lasted longer and, indeed, was bigger than the Roman Empire.III By 712, Muslim conquests extended from the Pyrenees to the Himalayas,21 from the Iberian Peninsula in the west to the Indus Valley and Central Asia in the east. 22 Muslims advanced into Europe until stopped in 732 by Charles Martel, king of the Franks, in the Battle of Poitiers in western France.23

Historians point out that Islam arose at the right time and place. In the sixth and early seventh centuries, a power vacuum emerged after protracted wars between the Persian and Byzantine empires had weakened both. As Muslims conquered Palestine, Syria, Egypt and Armenia, they promoted conversion to Islam in several ways. They gave polytheists the option of conversion or death (the Qur’an: “Slay the polytheists wherever you find them. But if they repent, and perform the prayer, and pay the alms, then let them go their way; God is all-forgiving, all-compassionate”).24 Jews and Christians were not required to become Muslims; however, if they did not convert, they were tolerated as subjects but not given equality and were required to pay a burdensome tax, jizya, ostensibly to pay for Muslim protection. There were also voluntary conversions not only for religious reasons, but also for the practical reasons of securing social and economic advantages in an Islamic society. For many converts, Islam might have had a comforting familiarity, embracing as it did monotheism and biblical messages that Judaism and Christianity had spread for many centuries before Muhammad began preaching around 610. St. John of Damascus, who first chronicled Islam in the eighth century, regarded Islam not as a new religion, but as a branch of Christianity.25

Historians emphasize that Islam also spread rapidly because of its extraordinary acceptance of diversity from the beginning—reminding us that Islam grew organically and not as an inflexible religion. In some conquered lands of the Byzantine empire, we know that the inhabitants had been persecuted, sometimes oppressed and heavily taxed by Christian rulers, and some minorities naturally welcomed the new Muslim rulers with their relatively tolerant religious policies. Islam also appeared to be far more accommodating than Christianity to other cultures—so accommodating, in fact, that apart from the Five Pillars, the practice of Islam varied enormously from place to place and often included practices and beliefs that were not consistent with the Qur’an.IV The rich legacy of Islamic civilizations, historians argue, is due in part to its exceptional absorptive quality and relative tolerance for different cultures and ethnic traditions of civilizations from southern Europe to Central Asia.

Early Divisions in Islam

Unlike Christians, who consider the Church to be the mystical body of Christ, Islam did not sustain a centralized organization. Instead, Prophet Muhammad’s khulafah, Caliphs or successors, provided leadership, but succession disputes frequently arose and divided—and redivided—the faithful. Religious authority became increasingly dispersed among the ulama, scholars and clerics, in numerous Islamic denominations spread throughout Muslim realms.

The debate over succession began immediately after Prophet Muhammad’s death, for he had left no indisputable instructions about the rules of succession or whether spiritual leaders were political leaders as well. Since Muhammad did not have a son, one faction wanted the Caliph to be elected from the ranks of respected leaders in the umma, the Muslim community. A rival group contended that the leadership should be confined to the Prophet’s immediate family and descendants. His closest surviving male relative was Ali ibn Abi Talib, who was both a cousin and the husband of his daughter, Fatima, as well as the father of two of Muhammad’s grandchildren, Hasan and Husayn.26

We know from history that, in this instance, election won out over heredity. But before the century was over, much Muslim blood was to be spilled in civil wars tied to the widening rifts over succession and legitimacy. Muhammad’s first successor was Abu Bakr, a compromise candidate because he was an honored leader as well as one of Muhammad’s fathers-in-law. Abu Bakr was the first of the four “Rightly Guided Caliphs,” as the first leaders are known. All four had been close companions of the Prophet and were considered authoritative sources of information about the Prophet’s life and teachings.27 Abu Bakr died a natural death, but the next three Rightly Guided Caliphs were all assassinated: Umar ibn al-Khattab in 644; Uthman ibn Affan in 656; and Ali ibn Abi Talib, Muhammad’s son-in-law, in 661. These assassinations sparked violent conflicts or outright wars.

Indeed, the theological and political consequences of these struggles over succession were far-reaching. After Ali’s assassination, Shiat Ali, the Party of Ali, created its own Shii branch of Islam. Initially, the break was over the succession dispute, with the Shii favoring a succession based on blood ties to the Prophet. Muslims who favored an elective system came to be known as Sunni, taking their name from sunna, which in this context refers to the customs, actions and sayings attributed to the Prophet and the first four Caliphs.28 (Otherwise, sunna refers only to the Prophet’s sayings and deeds.)29 Early divisions in Islam ultimately resulted in scores of Muslim denominations.30

But calling this break a dispute over succession does not nearly tell the whole story. In his recent book, Khalid Durán notes, “The conflict between Sunnism and Shi‘ism resembles that between Judaism and Christianity. Just as Christians have held Jews responsible for the killing of Christ, Shi‘is hold Sunnis responsible for the killing of ‘Alî and his sons, Hasan and [Husayn].” ‘Âshûrâ’, for example, is a religious holiday for both Shii and Sunni, but while the Shii mourn the anniversary of Husayn’s assassination, the Sunni have joyful celebrations commemorating God’s mercy in delivering the Israelites from Egyptian bondage—Passover in Judaism.31

Islam also developed a mystical component, called Sufism, that drew followers—as well as fierce and sometimes violent adversaries—from both Shii and Sunni Muslims. Sufism is named after the coarse shirts of wool, souf, worn by early ascetics who were reformers and, according to some mainstream Muslims, heretics.32

Even a thumbnail sketch of each of the three main Muslim denominations conveys a sense of Islam’s complexity as a religion:

Sunni Muslims

The Sunni represent the overwhelming majority of Muslims, but Sunni doctrine has long been a source of dispute. In the eighth and ninth centuries, there was a major theological conflict among the Sunni that has echoed throughout Islamic history. On one side, some schools of theology were led by Mu‘tazilite scholars in Basra and Baghdad. They used rational proofs for God and the universe, as they sought to harmonize reason with Muslim scriptures, proclaiming—blasphemously, to some—that the Qur’an was man-made and was not an eternal truth revealed by God.V The Mu‘tazilite scholars called for a rational theology, arguing that God has a rational nature and that moral laws and free will were part of the unchangeable essence of reason. The movement was the result of the encounter of Islam with earlier civilizations—Persian and Greco-Roman—and especially with the traditions of Greek philosophy.

A few early Caliphs tried to enforce this rational approach as the exclusive interpretation of Islam. Had they been successful, they would also have solidified their authority not only as political leaders, but also as the final arbiters of religious law. But in 848, after several decades of Mu‘tazilism being the Caliphate’s official doctrine, Caliph al-Mutawakkil succumbed to widespread opposition from the ulama, the religious establishment. As the Caliphate saw its religious authority chipped away, the Caliphs’ claim to rule as successors of the Prophet came under increasing attack from the ulama. The resulting loss of a central religious authority meant that, for Sunni Muslims, there would be many interpreters within the ulama at many theological centers in many regions.

Shii Muslims

Shii believe that Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law, was divinely inspired and infallible in his interpretations of the Qur’an and the Prophet’s teachings and that only his descendants possessed the sacred blood ties and religious knowledge to qualify as Imams, the Shii’s exemplary leaders.

Hence, according to Shii theology, called Imami, the line of succession passed through Ali and Fatima; and the Imam could be any male descendant of their sons, Hasan and Husayn. Difficulties arose after Ali and Fatima’s elder son, Hasan, died in 669, and their second son, Husayn, along with relatives and friends, was assassinated in 680 in the Battle of Karbala, after challenging the authority of Caliph Yazid ibn Muawiyyah to rule and asserting his right to the Prophet’s succession. Ali’s third son (with another wife), Hanafiyya, died in 700. Shii sects developed around each son, the Hanafids, the Husaynids and the Hasanids. Other denominations also emerged around other branches of the Prophet’s clan.

Succession disputes were intensified when there was more than one male descendant; in one instance, Muhammad al-Baqir, the fifth Imam, denied his brother’s claim to be Imam by asserting that he, like prior Imams, had a mystical ability to interpret the Qur’an and had also been anointed by his father. His brother, Zayd ibn Ali, challenged that view and developed his own following.33 The Zaydis are one of three major Shii sects:

The Zaydis. They believed that the Imam could be any male descendant of Ali and Fatima’s sons, Hasan and Husayn. The Imam was also expected to be a learned man, namely an expert in Islamic law, as well as an able warrior. But unlike some other sects, they did not believe the Imam was infallible. More than one Imam can be present, in different territories, and an Imam can be deposed if deemed sinful. During times when there was no Imam—as is the case now in Yemen, where most Zaydis live—spiritual leadership was vested in Zaydi scholars until a new Imam arrived.

The Ismailis. In the eighth century, there was a Shii conflict over which son of Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq should succeed him: Ismail ibn Ja‘far or his younger brother, Musa al-Kazim. Each brother developed his own following. Ismail’s followers—Ismailis—revere him as the last of Ali and Fatima’s descendants. The Ismailis, unlike the Zaydis, consider the Imam infallible. Another major succession dispute, also between two brothers, arose in the 11th century and split the Ismailis into two major denominations—one led today by the Aga Khan and another denomination known as the Buhura Ismailis.34 Many smaller Ismaili sects appeared as well.VI

The Twelvers. While the Ismailis followed Ismail ibn Ja‘far and his descendants, the Twelver Shii followed the lineage of his brother, Musa al-Kazim. The Twelver Shii had many conflicts with Sunni Muslims, who kept several of the Twelver Imams under house arrest. Many Imams were apparently poisoned as well, including the 11th Imam. The 12th Imam, a young boy, disappeared in 874. Followers of the 12th Imam—hence, Twelvers—believe that God rescued him, that he was “occluded,” taken up, and that he will return as a messiah to restore peace and justice in the world. Until he returns, political and religious authority are exercised, fallibly, by the clergy; in order of rising rank, they include mujtahids, hujjatu-l-islam, ayatullah, ayatullah ‘uzma and, the highest rank, marja‘-e-taqlîd, the one who sets the norms to be followed. Ayatullah, meaning “sign of God,” is used only among Shii in Iran; it first appeared in the 18th century, invented by a king who, like monarchs everywhere then, coined and sold titles, including ayatullah.35 (Ayatullah ‘Uzma Ruhollah Khomeini, who led the 1979 revolution in Iran, was often called “Imam.” This was an innovation because, unlike in Sunni Islam, in Twelver Shii Islam the term Imam refers only to the twelve Imams. Ayatullah Khomeini stressed the point that he was imam only in the sense of prayer leader and spiritual guide and nothing more.)36

The Shii, and especially the Twelvers, have developed a vast and complex religious hierarchy that may be comparable, in some ways, to the structure of Christian churches. In this regard, the Shii are also very different from the Sunni, who, somewhat inconsistently, have many religious leaders but no religious hierarchy of such complexity; they consider Islam to be a decentralized religion.37 Indeed, it is this decentralization that gives rise to persistent questions about who has authority to speak for Islam.

Twelvers believed that religious principles could be found through use of God-given reason, though these principles could not contradict the Qur’an or sayings of the Prophet or the twelve Imams—for these sacred texts were believed to contain all the rules of reason. The Twelver legal school was developed by Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq, the sixth Imam—hence the name Ja‘fari for the law school. The Ja‘fari accorded equal weight to the behavior and sayings of the infallible Imams and to those of the Prophet. In addition, other ulama advocated varying levels of independent reason as acceptable in applying the hadith and Qur’an to issues of the day. On one side, the Usulis felt free to use analogies and rationality in interpreting the sacred texts; at the other end of the spectrum, the Akhbaris insisted on a strict, literal reading. The Twelver denomination has about 140 million members in more than a dozen nations today. Twelver Shiism became the official religion of Iranians during the Safavid empire in the early 16th century. Currently, there are also Twelvers in Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and other oil-rich countries.38

Sufi Muslims

Within its many denominations, Sufism developed in the 10th century as an early effort to reform Islam, in part by emphasizing spiritual rewards in the afterlife rather than material gains in this life, and in part by challenging literal, legalistic approaches to Islam and the Qur’an. Sufis seek to commune directly with God through meditation, ritual chanting and even dance (the Mevlavi Sufis were famously known as the whirling dervishes). Some Sufis even worshiped Jesus and others worshiped Muhammad—practices considered polytheistic and blasphemous to mainstream Muslims, who sometimes persecuted the Sufis.39 Yet Sufis often served as Islam’s most energetic missionaries in addition to their many contributions to Muslim literature, especially love poetry, in Arabic, Turkish, Persian and Urdu.40 Khalid Durán calls Sufism Islam’s “counterculture.”41

This cursory description of Islam’s denominations illustrates the wide and deep theological divisions within what might appear from the outside as a monolithic religion. These divisions, in turn, led to extremely complex and varied theological and political differences even within mainstream Sunni Islam.

Stopping New Efforts to Interpret the Qur’an and Hadith

The efforts of the ulama to formalize Islamic doctrine for mainstream Sunni Muslims led to the emergence of four prominent schools of Islamic law in the eighth and ninth centuries. The four Sunni schools made a religious science out of hadith by checking the authenticity of each link in the chain of sources of oral history and by resolving discrepancies in reports on the Prophet’s words and deeds.VII The schools, still influential today, are the Hanafi (named after Abu Hanifah, who was born in Central Asia), which is now followed in parts of South Asia, Turkey, the Russian Federation with the exception of the North Caucasus, southeastern Europe, China, Central and West Asia and parts of the Middle East; Maliki (named after Malik ibn Anas), which is followed in North and West Africa and in some southern parts of the Middle East; Shafi (named after Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi), which is followed in the coastal areas of South Asia, East Africa, East Asia, Egypt and some parts of the Middle East; and Hanbali (named after Ahmad ibn Hanbal), which is followed mostly in Saudi Arabia.

The schools varied in their amount of leeway in interpreting Sharia, Islamic law, and whether those interpretations could be made by individual scholars or had to be endorsed by a consensus of scholars.42 The Malikis and the Hanbalis read the scripture and hadith quite literally, scorning the use of human reason as it was employed by the other two, more interpretative schools. The Hanafis used analogy and reason, especially in untangling conflicting statements attributed to the Prophet. The Shafis sought to concentrate on the most authentic oral reports and looked to find a consensus among scholars on interpretive rulings.43 The issue was—and still is—extremely important, because such interpretations became part of the Sharia, which Muslims consider to be the divinely revealed law of Islam.

In the 10th century, orthodox Sunni ulama argued that there had been enough of this independent reasoning and warned that it could not continue without distorting Islam. They maintained that the Sharia was completely and finally assembled within three centuries of Muhammad’s death and it was time to “close the gates of ijtihad,” or rational interpretation. This argument gained ground and was finally formalized in the 14th century when Sunni ulama agreed that contemporary questions could be answered only by a literal reading of the Sharia and not by new interpretation.44

But many Muslim reformers, from the 11th century on, objected to such a “mechanistic,” literal approach to scripture and argued that the schools of law were too rigid in defining Sharia. Much debate has centered around the hadith, with reformers questioning the vast number of oral histories, the often conflicting interpretations of the hadith and the ulama’s ability to verify the Prophet’s sayings as they were passed down through the ages by his friends, family and community members. Reformers in the past, and especially in the 19th century, attempted to portray the hadith as parables, not to be construed as religious doctrine or law—and certainly not to be used to diminish the exercise of God-given reason in addressing contemporary challenges. Different approaches to Sharia not only divided Sunni, but also sharpened the divisions and struggles between Sunni and Shii.VIII That is because the Sunni believe the Sharia is complete, while the Shii consider it to be evolving jurisprudence.45

Muslim Empires and the Golden Age of Islam

The early formative period of the Muslim empire was followed by the Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258), named after Caliph Abu al-Abbas al-Saffah,46 who claimed descent from an uncle of Muhammad’s.47 He transferred the seat of power from Damascus to Baghdad and inaugurated what is known as the Golden Age of Islamic civilization. This Golden Age is no mere footnote in Islamic history, for, arguably, “Islamic” civilization was essentially human civilization—one that, like prior Greek and Roman civilizations, embraced and thrived on all human achievement. As such, we are just beginning to recognize the enormous influence that Islam’s Golden Age had on Western Christendom, as W. Montgomery Watt reminds us:

It is clear that the influence of Islam on Western Christendom is greater than is usually realized. Not only did Islam share with Western Europe many material products and technological discoveries; not only did it stimulate Europe intellectually in the fields of science and philosophy; but it provoked Europe into forming a new image of itself. Because Europe was reacting against Islam, it belittled the influence [of Muslim scholarship].... So today, an important task for our Western Europeans, as we move into the era of the one world, is to correct this false emphasis and to acknowledge fully our debt to the Arab and Islamic world.48

During those five “golden” centuries, Muslim realms became the world’s unrivaled intellectual centers of science, medicine, philosophy and education. The Abbasids championed the role of knowledge and are renowned for such enlightened achievements as creating a “House of Wisdom” in Baghdad, the city they built on the banks of the Tigris River. At this Abbasid institute, Muslim and non-Muslim scholars49—including Nestorian Christians and star-worshiping Sabians—sought to translate all the world’s knowledge into Arabic. Classic works by Aristotle, Archimedes, Euclid, Hypocrites, Plutarch, Ptolemy and others were translated. Christian monks translated the Bible into Arabic, and many Jewish philosophers wrote in Arabic.

Without these Arabic translations, it is interesting to note, many classic works of antiquity would have been lost. Furthermore, from the 11th to the 13th centuries, many Arabic translations of classic works were, in turn, translated into Turkish, Persian, Hebrew and Latin. The 13th-century Catholic theologian St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, apparently made his famous integration of faith and reason after reading Aristotle’s philosophy in a translation by Abbasid scholars, including Abu Ali ibn Sina, known in the West as Avicenna.50 Avicenna was an 11th-century philosopher and physician who wrote an encyclopedia of philosophy and some 200 influential treatises on medicine, including one on ethics, which were widely read in Europe. Abu al-Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Rushd, better known in the West as Averroës, was a preeminent authority on Aristotle as well as a judge and a physician. This 12th-century philosopher is also known for having synthesized Greek and Arabic philosophies. Meanwhile, al-Farabi tried to show that the ideal political system envisaged in Plato’s utopia and in the divine law of Islam were one and the same.

Not merely translators, the Abbasids collected, synthesized and advanced knowledge, building their own civilization from intellectual gifts from many cultures, including the Chinese, Indian, Iranian, Egyptian, North African, Greek, Spanish, Sicilian and Byzantine. This Islamic period was indeed a cauldron of cultures, religions, learning and knowledge—one that created great civilizations and influenced others from Africa to China. This Golden Age has been hailed for its open embrace of a universal science, no matter the source—believing that there was not a “Christian science,” “Jewish science,” “Muslim science,” “Zoroastrian science” or “Hindu science.” There was just one science for the Abbasids, who were apparently influenced by numerous Qur’anic references to learning about the wonders of the universe as a way to honor God. Thus, reason and faith, both being God-given, were combined, mutually inclusive and supportive. Islam was anything but isolationist, and Abbasids connected to all cultural traditions, believing as they did that learning was universal, and not confined to their own domain. Non-Muslims—as well as today’s doctrinaire Muslims who preach against “Western” values and “Western” science—may be shocked by the Abbasids’ receptiveness to science and philosophies that challenged orthodoxy.

According to Ismail Serageldin, “The search for Knowledge (‘Ilm) and Truth (Haq) are an integral and undeniable part of the Muslim tradition. The pursuit of knowledge is the single most striking feature in a system of great revelation such as Islam. The word ‘Ilm (knowledge) and its derivatives occur 880 times in the [Qur’an]. But knowledge is not perceived as neutral. It is the basis for better appreciating truth (Haq), which is revealed but which can be ‘seen’ by the knowledgeable in the world around them. Indeed, believers are enjoined to look around and to learn the truth. The Prophet exhorted his followers to seek knowledge as far as China, then considered to be the end of the earth. Scientists are held in high esteem: the Prophet said that the ink of scientists is equal to the blood of martyrs.”51

The Abbasids were not alone in the Islamic pursuit of knowledge. Rival Muslim dynasties known as Fatimids in Egypt and Umayyads in al-Andalus, or Islamic Spain, were also intellectual and cultural centers during parts of this period.52 Al-Andalus, captured from its Gothic rulers, became part of the Islamic empire in 714 and rivaled Baghdad and Cairo in scholarship. Córdoba, Andalus’s capital, is believed to have had 70 libraries, including one in the Alcázar with 400,000 volumes. Religious freedom, although limited, helped attract Jewish and Christian intellectuals and, interestingly, spawned the greatest period of creativity in philosophy during the Middle Ages as 11th- and 12th-century networks of Muslim, Jewish and Christian philosophers interacted.53 Andalus was a great literary center, and its poetry about courtly, chaste and chivalrous relationships has even been credited with helping shape European ideas about romantic love.54

Together, Abbasid, Fatimid and Andalusi scholars opened up new fields of study and significantly advanced the knowledge of astronomy, architecture, art, botany, ethics, geography, history, literature, mathematics, music, mechanics, medicine, mineralogy, philosophy, physics and even veterinary medicine and zoology. During the Abbasid period, mathematicians pioneered integral calculus and spherical trigonometry, promoted the use of the “Arabic numerals” 0 through 9, and gave the world al-jabr, our algebra. In science, the Abbasids revised Ptolemaic astronomy, named stars, developed al-kemia, our chemistry, and demonstrated that science was, well, a science. Some may also thank, or damn, Abbasids for al-kuhl, our alcohol, which they learned to distill but were subsequently forbidden to drink.

Education was a high priority in Muslim empires during this period. By the 10th century, there were thousands of schools at mosques, places for kneeling, including 300 in Baghdad alone. A number of libraries gathered manuscripts from around the world, and schools that would become universities were established. Under the Fatimids, a Cairo mosque that opened for prayers in 972 eventually grew into the University of Al-Azhar, the oldest university in the Mediterranean.55

The Abbasids’ great learning centers were not confined to Medina, Basra, Kufa and Damascus—and while Baghdad remained the cultural capital of Islamic realms from the 11th century to the middle of the 13th century, we see the proliferation of cultural and intellectual centers in such cities as Jerusalem, Cairo, Kairouan, Fez, Córdoba, Toledo and Seville—as well as in many cities of Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia, such as Nishapur, Merv, Bukhara, Samarkand, Balkh, Herat, Ghazna, Rayy, Shiraz, Hamadan and Isfahan. In other words, Islam never organized itself for action as a civilization except, perhaps, in its formative period.

Fragmentation of Political Power

But even in Islam’s Golden Age, we witness fragmentation of political power. For there was not one, but three Caliphates—Abbasids, Fatimids and Umayyads in Spain—that ruled Muslim societies.

In 909, Shii Muslims of the Ismaili denomination established a Caliphate-Imam in Tunisia under leaders who claimed descent from the Prophet’s son-in-law, Ali, and his daughter, Fatima—hence their name, Fatimids. As mentioned earlier, the Fatimids’ and Umayyads’ sponsorship of science and education helped make this period Islam’s Golden Age. The Fatimids captured Egypt in 969 and established their capital, al-Qahira—the “Victorious City”—Cairo.56 The dynasty’s rule at one time extended to the Mediterranean, North Africa, Syria, Iran and India, and it lasted until 1171, when the last Fatimid Caliph was deposed.57 It was Salah al-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub, a Kurdish general known in the West as Saladin, who defeated the Fatimids in Egypt and brought the region’s population back into the fold of Sunni Islam. Later, Saladin gained fame for defeating the Crusaders and recapturing Jerusalem in 1187. Saladin’s Ayyubid dynasty (1171–1250) ruled over Egypt, Syria and Yemen, and it ended when members of its army, predominantly slaves called Mamluks, revolted and created their own empire in the Near East.58

In 929, 20 years after the Fatimid Caliph-Imam was established, another Caliphate sprang up in al-Andalus, Islamic Spain. Abd al-Rahman III, who traced his ancestry to the Umayyad Caliphate that the Abbasids had overthrown, proclaimed himself Caliph. He assumed the title “Commander of the Faithful” and asserted independence from the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad and the newly independent Fatimid Caliphs. He and his descendants ruled as Caliphs in Córdoba until 1031, when the Caliphate was officially abolished as the central government collapsed amid infighting among regional leaders.59

In addition to Caliphates, other regional dynasties—kingdoms unto themselves—rose, fell and reconstituted themselves again and again over the centuries under new rulers. Notable among them in the early centuries of Islam were various Iranian and Turkic dynasties, including the Samanids and the Shii Buyids. The latter conquered Baghdad but maintained the Abbasid Caliphate.60

West and East Clash over Territory

Much has been made of the early encounters between Muslim armies and the Crusaders and the wars’ impact on the course of history in the Middle East and subsequent relations between Christians and Muslims. The facts, however, do not fit easily into ideological patterns. We know that the Seljuq Turks invaded the Christian empire of Byzantium, setting off a chain of events that led to the Crusades—which history shows were mostly territorial wars camouflaged in religious garb and language and carried out under the symbol of the cross. Initially, the Byzantine emperor sought help fighting off the Seljuq Turks from Pope Urban II, who in turn wanted to strengthen his moral and political authority by capturing Jerusalem. Muslims had conquered the city in 638, and though they were generally tolerant of non-Muslims, one Caliph-Imam, al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, had ordered the destruction of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem and some other churches and convents in Egypt and Sinai during his 25-year reign, which ended in 1021.61

In launching the “holy war” against Muslims, the Pope declared, “God wills it!” The Church promised Christian soldiers fighting in this war that, win or lose, they would have all sins forgiven and a welcome in heaven—the kind of blanket guarantees that encouraged, and continues to encourage, “holy warriors” of every religion to commit crimes and atrocities. At the time, the Crusaders were known to Muslims for what they were: Franks, a German-speaking Christian empire that ruled present-day France. They led their armies into what would later be called the First Crusade. They captured Jerusalem in 1099, massacring, enslaving or expelling its non-Christian inhabitants—Jews and Muslims alike. But as we know, the Crusades rapidly degenerated into intra-Christian wars,62 for Europeans were just as eager to seize and plunder the lands of Christian Byzantium as the Muslim Turks had been. It’s ironic that, in doing so, the Christian West set the stage for the eventual collapse of the Byzantine empire and its loss to the Ottoman Turks. In 1187, Saladin defeated the Crusaders at the Battle of Hattin and recaptured Jerusalem.63 As we know, in the Third Crusade, Saladin’s troops surrendered, in a stalemate, to Richard I (“the Lion-Hearted”) in 1191 on the Mediterranean at the city of Acre. They divided up the territory, with Muslims keeping Jerusalem but promising to accommodate Christian pilgrims.

The fact is that the Crusaders did not terminate the Abbasid Caliphate and its Golden Age of Muslim civilizations. It ended, finally, in 1258, when Baghdad was destroyed by the Mongol hordes, one of the world’s most brutal conquerors, who created the biggest empire in history. Their territory extended at various times to Eastern Europe, China, Korea, Mongolia, Persia, Turkestan, Armenia, Russia, Burma, Vietnam and Thailand. Before reaching Baghdad, the Mongols had already destroyed many Muslim cities under the ruthless and skilled leadership of Genghis Khan and his descendants. To encourage their foes to surrender without a fight, the Mongols used “state-of-the-art” military strategies that included the destruction of all stored grain, the obliteration of irrigation systems, the razing of cities and towns, the systematic massacre of local populations, the stacking of victims’ skulls in huge pyramids and the use of civilian prisoners as human shields—and even as human bridges, to enable Mongols to cross moats of newly besieged cities.

The Mongol invasion was so catastrophic, it created a sense of doomsday for Muslims—after all, the faithful were being crushed by “infidels,” creating a great crisis of confidence. At the same time, some historians have argued, the Mongol invasions, after initially paralyzing Muslim societies, subsequently provided a long stretch of peace—the so-called Pax Mongolica—across a vast stretch of territory that allowed the resilient Muslim societies not only to reemerge, but to flourish.64 Following their conquests, the Mongols rebuilt many Muslim cities, created dazzling courts and, to some degree, picked up where the Abbasids, Fatimids and Umayyads left off in promoting science, art and scholarship.

Indeed, it is one of history’s great landmarks that the Mongols converted to Islam—a conversion that saved the Muslim power and realms, changing the course of history. Their conversion was also relatively swift. By the early 14th century, all four of the Mongol realms had adopted Islam.

Rise and Fall of the Ottomans

The emergence of European commercial and political power in the Mediterranean in the 15th century coincided with the rise of the Muslim Ottoman empire. The Ottomans became the most powerful of western Muslim rulers, capturing Constantinople in 1453. They won battles with a highly trained corps of converted slaves and new weapons that used gunpowder. In their march through the 15th and 16th centuries, the Ottomans conquered Egypt, Syria, Hungary, Cyprus and Rhodes, eventually creating one of the largest empires in history.

Coinciding with the rise of the Ottoman empire, from the 15th century through the 17th century, two other empires emerged: the Safavids in Iran and the MughalsIX (Persian for Mongols) in India. Other emergent powers included the sultans of Morocco and the Uzbeks in Central Asia. Actually, even within these realms, we see the emergence of semi-independent dynasties in the regions of the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, Central Asia, Afghanistan, India and equatorial Africa. The key point is that even at this height of Muslim power, there was no single Muslim umma, or community, and the Turkish, Arabic, Iranian and Indian realms had divided the unity of Islam politically, culturally and economically while retaining only the unity of the fundamental precepts and Five Pillars of Islam.

The first major manifestation of Muslim military weakness occurred in 1571, when Spanish and Venetian fleets defeated the Ottomans in a naval battle off Lepanto, Greece—a victory that was captured in heroic paintings by Tintoretto and Veronese. The second major loss was the Turks’ unsuccessful siege of Vienna, in 1683. However, the empire’s actual disintegration began with its first territorial concession in the 1699 Treaty of Carlowicz, when it ceded Hungary to Austria,65 followed by a treaty with France and the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, imposed on the empire by Russia.66 It was not the loss of territory so much as the fact that, beginning with the treaties, European powers began to obtain economic, commercial and political concessions from the Ottoman empire as well as from the Iranian and Mughal Indian empires. These concessions, known later as capitulations, became the engine of Europe’s political, economic and military domination of the Muslim realms. European nation-states were also gaining dominance by modernizing their economies, using new military technologies and centralizing their political authorities.

From the 18th century on, then, we see the gradual stagnation or decline of all three remaining Muslim empires, which were hamstrung by their increasing insularity, their inability to control the flow of trade along international trade routes and their limited ability to take advantage of technological innovation during the Industrial Revolution. Through invasion, colonization or economic dominance, the British controlled much of India, the Russians defeated the Ottomans in Crimea, and France occupied Egypt.67 The first two major challenges against the Ottoman empire in the Middle East were Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798 and the French occupation of Algeria in 1830.X

There are many other factors that contributed to the decline of the Ottoman empire and a number of theories about why it eventually fell. Among them:

  • A decline in the effectiveness of the sultans and the quality of their administrations. While the early centuries of the Ottoman empire were marked by some extremely able and sometimes brilliant leaders, this was not the case in the empire’s later years, when individuals who lacked the ability and strategic foresight of their predecessors came to power. Among Ottoman rulers, there also developed a sense of complacency and a belief in the infallibility of Ottoman institutions and the inferiority of “the infidels.” A population explosion, which could not be supported by the land available for cultivation, along with the failure of land reforms that resulted in peasant unrest and social and economic disruptions.
  • The failure of the empire to integrate various nations, peoples and regions into a cohesive whole. As a result, the empire remained a collection of different ethnic and religious populations (millets), such as Greek Orthodox, Armenian and Jewish, as well as semiautonomous regions (Arabia, Lebanon, North Africa and the like) without a common, unifying identity or unity of purpose.
  • Financial and economic crises at the beginning of the 16th century, which led to the depreciation and debasement of currency, high inflation and unemployment.
  • The inability of native merchants in the empire to compete effectively with European joint stock companies that had long-term strategies as well as reserves and the political muscle of the European powers behind them.
  • The decline of the empire’s military forces.
  • The lack of development of cities to serve as economic centers and a base for the rise of a middle class.
  • Perhaps most important of all, the rise of 19th-century nationalism in all the regions of the Ottoman empire, involving Christians at first and then, later, even Muslim peoples within the empire, such as Arabs and Turks.68


By the early 20th century, Britain, France, Russia and the Netherlands ruled over nearly all Muslim societies, with only Afghanistan, Iran, and a much reduced Ottoman empire retaining their independence.69

The Big Debate: Herodians vs. Zealots

The decline of Muslim realms created another crisis of confidence and raised many questions. How should Muslims challenge European colonialism so as to regain, or retain, their independence and political and economic viability? The debate divided along two basic lines: On one side, some argued that the decline was caused by moral laxity and departure from the true path of Islam; these traditionalists called for an Islamic revival. On the other side, there were those who claimed that Islamic societies had not suddenly declined, but had long faltered owing to a chronic failure to modernize their societies and institutions; these reformers said Muslim societies could be rescued only by modernizing and challenging the West on its own terms. Each option had its risks. Looking to the past for answers risked greater stagnation. Looking to the future risked the loss of indigenous culture—was it possible to modernize without Westernizing? The contest between these two responses still shakes the Muslim world.

Historian Arnold Toynbee attempted to encapsulate the essence of this conflict between modernists and traditionalists not only in Muslim societies, but in all societies. In his 12-volume Study of History, Toynbee refers to modernists and traditionalists as “Herodians” and “Zealots,” terms borrowed from the Jewish experience. In his theory of history, civilizations rise when people make creative responses to a variety of challenges, including geographic, economic, political and spiritual; and their continuing creativity sustains their civilizations. He theorizes that civilizations fall in a downward spiral, with creativity faltering, challenges not being met, anarchy developing and tyrants taking charge. Ultimately, these declining civilizations are threatened by more creative and dynamic ones. In response, Toynbee says, the threatened people typically follow one of two basic paths: If the Zealot leaders prevail, the civilization responds by isolating itself and trying to revive ideas and practices from an idealized past. If Herodians take the lead, the civilization responds by borrowing its opponents’ best tools, synthesizing their best ideas and using the new tools and ideas to compete and regain strength and control. Naturally, in his view, successful civilizations are those that accept the Herodian challenge, while the others ossify or decline.

Of course, not everyone agrees with Toynbee’s crystallization of history into two forces—and certainly Zealots or traditionalists do not. But Toynbee is insightful in describing the intense struggles between modernism and traditionalism in Muslim societies that have been occurring, off and on, for more than a century. Moreover, both modernists and traditionalists look at the entire history of Islam, rationalizing past successes and failures in ways that bolster their current theological, ideological and political stances.

Clash of Modernists and Traditionalists

Until the 19th century, the Muslim struggle against colonial powers was considered the domain of secular political authorities, but gradually the struggle was joined by so-called national liberation movements. For while Europe exported colonialism and imperialism to Muslim realms, it could not avoid exporting also the ideas and legacies of the Enlightenment, nationalism, European institutions and political movements—liberal, conservative and radical. As such, the colonialists sowed the seeds of anticolonial movements, which used European ideologies against European dominance. Indeed, generations of nationalist leaders in the Middle East and North Africa were educated in European and even American institutions of higher education—including the American University of Beirut, founded in 1866, and the American University of Cairo, founded in 1919.

It is also not surprising that Muslim nationalists attempted to use Islam and the ulama as organizing tools to mobilize their societies against the colonial powers. (After all, the colonial powers themselves used religion as an effective tool to undermine nationalist and anticolonial movements.) Naturally, these alliances proved to be only temporary and expedient, especially because nationalism was then a new and not well understood concept—and a secular one at that. The idea of a secular nation, separate from the religious community, the umma, was, in theory, alien to Islam. But even though religion and state were not distinctly separated, they had been administered separately by Caliphs and the ulama for centuries.71 Yet in their shared effort to combat colonialism and imperialism, the ulama and other traditionalists marched, off and on, under the banner of nationalism. As a result, across colonized Muslim societies Islamic revivals proliferated—and while they energized nationalist movements, the revivals also empowered the ulama, positioning them to assume greater authority. Hence, anticolonialism sometimes took on a religious fervor, one that Muslim reformers have often been unable to moderate; mobilizing the ulama was easy, demobilizing them has proven difficult.

Muslim history and theology provided both the necessary language and the justification for a struggle against the European intruders. Muhammad had preached that the umma, the Muslim community, must be totally focused on jihad, meaning “to struggle,” to live in the way God intended, as laid out in the Qur’an. Throughout Muslim history, the concept of jihad has been used to encourage piety among individuals as well as to wage war to defend the faith or convert “infidels,” or both.XI If there was prosperity in the umma, it indicated that Muslims were living according to His will; if the umma declined, it was a sign that they had strayed from the Qur’an. Any attack on this religious community, from within or without, was considered an act of blasphemy or an act of aggression that must be checked through jihad.72

At the same time, some 19th-century Islamic movements were more interested in reviving Islam than in overthrowing colonial rule elsewhere. Such was the case with Sunni Wahhabis, members of a puritanical denomination in the Arabian peninsula. Named after the 18th-century reformer Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, they also called themselves Muwahhiduns, Unitarians. They condemned many modern innovations73 and advocated a strict and literal adherence to the Qur’an and hadith in an effort to practice Islam as they believed it was practiced in the seventh century and, thus, experience the strength Islam had given to early Muslims.74 The teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab represent the strictest interpretations of the Hanbali school.

In India, the most influential advocate of traditionalism was the Deoband school of thought. Known formally as Darul Uloom Deoband and named after its location in the Delhi region of northern India, the school is considered by some to be second only to Al-Azhar in Cairo as the most important center of traditional Islamic studies. Deoband was established in 1866 by Maulana Mohammed Qasim Nanauti to preserve the Muslim heritage against the encroachments of British colonialism. Yet the school grew from its orthodox Wahhabi beginnings into a more modern school, exhibiting sharp differences with other Muslim traditionalists—and even with its own offshoots in other countries. The Deoband, for example, supported India’s secular constitution and religious pluralism. The school also opposed the partition of the Indian subcontinent and the creation of a Muslim homeland in Pakistan. As Marghboor Rahman, the seminary’s vice chancellor, recently put it, “We are Indians first, then Muslims.”XII

Self-Determination Movements of All Kinds

Nationalist movements in the 19th century were not confined to ruling ethnic majorities in Muslim empires, and minorities soon became enthused with their own nationalist aspirations as well. It is not surprising, therefore, to see Greeks, Albanians, Armenians, Macedonians, Serbs and Bulgarians adopting nationalism as a revolutionary movement in pursuit of a national reformation, autonomy or even independence from the Ottoman empire. Nationalism was an equal opportunity ideology. It was welcomed not only by non-Muslim ethnic groups, but also by minority ethnic groups of Muslims who attempted to find autonomy or independence. Following the Greeks’ success in winning independence in 1830, we see all the others heading toward autonomy.

What was far more controversial, however, was the rise of nationalism among Arabs, Turks and other majority ethnic groups of Muslims. Such a development posed a great challenge to the traditional concept of the Muslim umma as a theocracy, with the ulama as its proponent—for here was an ideological movement that was breaking Muslims’ political ties to the umma, leaving behind only the religious bonds. Thus, nationalism became not only a unifying force, but a fragmenting one as well. For these ethnic Muslim groups were attempting to recreate their own umma—recognizing “national independence” both as a national right and as a Muslim right.

Moreover, in some of these nationalist struggles we even see Christians and Muslims joining together to transcend their religious differences and form new states or secular political parties. We witness a growing awareness of their past glories and talk about their “historical missions,” their destiny and the uniqueness of their languages. People saw themselves not just as a religious community, but as a community that shared distinct cultural, ethnic, geographic and historical bonds. In Syria, Christians and Muslims cooperated in forging a national identity based on their common Arabic language and culture; similarly, in Egypt, Coptic Christians and Muslims collaboratively created a nationalist identity based on their love of the land and centuries of overlapping pharaonic, Christian and Muslim cultures.

Even conservative Muslims were reminded that there were historical precedents for bringing together such heterogeneous communities—after all, the Prophet Muhammad’s first umma in Medina included pagan, Jewish and Muslim members. In India, too, we see interfaith, nationalist coalitions: the Hindu-dominated Congress political party included many prominent Muslim leaders who shared the aspirations for an independent India and opposed partition.

Secular Efforts to Create Unity Flounder

Not only do we see the emergence of secular nationalist movements that challenged European colonialists, but we also see the emergence of secular “Pan-” movements in Muslim realms between the 1870s and 1918. These movements were similar to the Pan-German and Pan-Slav movements in that they attempted to unite ethnic groups that shared a “common blood,” language or culture for a common purpose. The Muslim “Pan-” movements included Pan-Turkism, which was an effort to unite all Turkish-speaking peoples, and Pan-Iranism, which was a movement to unite all Persian-speaking peoples. Reaching still further, others called for a Pan-Islamism, a secular movement that could bridge both secular and religious aspirations of Muslims worldwide.75 To Muslim modernists, these movements were organizing tools to promote political freedom and create large ethnic units that might give them access to natural and other resources for greater strength, economically and militarily. But to the ulama and other traditionalists who supported these movements, they were merely expedient vehicles for unifying the religious community, to recreate the umma as a theocracy.

Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, an Iranian scholar and political activist, was the first theoretician of Pan-Islamism and Muslim modernism, which was a blend of Pan-Islamism, secularism and nationalism.76 Al-Afghani had seriously challenged the authorities, both Muslim and European, since the 1870s.77 He had warned about “the danger of European intervention, the need for national unity to resist it, the need for a broader unity of the Islamic peoples [and] the need for a constitution to limit the ruler’s power.” He ascribed the decline of Muslim power to a combination of European imperialism, autocratic Muslim rulers and a retrogressive ulama that saw no place for Islam in the modern world. Al-Afghani called for engaging as well as confronting the West, creating Muslim-style democracies and reforming Islam—to encourage the creation of new ideas, much as it had done during the Golden Age of science and learning in the Abbasid period.78 In a “Lecture on Teaching and Learning,” given in 1882 in Calcutta, al-Afghani said:

The strangest thing of all is that our ulama these days have divided science intotwo parts. One they call Muslim science, and one European science. Because of this they forbid others to teach some of the useful sciences. They have not understood that science is that noble thing that has no connection with any nation, and is not distinguished by anything but itself. Rather, everything that is known is known by science, and every nation that becomes renowned becomes renowned through science.… The Islamic religion is the closest of religions to science and knowledge, and there is no incompatibility between science and knowledge and the foundation of the Islamic faith.79

These modernist ideas were not confined to the Ottoman empire or to the Indian subcontinent, Iran or Russia; they even flourished in such isolated lands as Afghanistan. There, Mahmud Tarzi, a modernist who published the first Afghan newspaper—Siraj al-Akhbar Afghaniyah (the Lamp of the News of Afghanistan)—argued in 1911 that European colonists were pursuing policies that propagated materialism and were designed to sap the strength of Islam. To this end, he said, colonists supported the activities of Christian missionaries, capitalized on and even promoted divisions among the Muslims, and instituted educational programs in their colonies that were aimed at stifling the revival of Islam.80

In Tarzi’s view, Muslims needed to protect their common heritage by closing ranks behind unified political, cultural, economic and military strategies. He and others were inspired by Japan’s stunning defeat of its far more powerful adversary in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. They reasoned that if a nation like Japan, which lacked many natural resources, could nearly annihilate the Russians’ Baltic fleet and defeat its army in Manchuria, then there was hope that Muslim nations, working together in a disciplined way, could recapture their autonomy and power from the Europeans.

The Postcolonial Struggle

During the colonial period, Muslim elites—the rationalists, secularists and modernists, however one might describe them—attempted to build an infrastructure for modern statehood in anticipation of the eventual liberation of their lands. But they had an uphill struggle. Efforts to modernize Muslim economies during colonial periods were skewed by the needs of the Europeans, who sought raw materials for European factories and a growing colonial market for finished products. In addition, there were internal conflicts, such as the ulama’s opposition to modern banking, based on the Qur’anic ban on charging interest. As a result, Muslim countries, not unlike others in Asia and Africa, were not able to successfully meet the multiple challenges of the Industrial Revolution and its aftermath. Muslim nations lacked the capital, among other things, to modernize rapidly. In one instance, Egypt was headed for insolvency after completing an ambitious program—which included building the Suez Canal, 900 miles of railway and vast irrigation projects. Its precarious financial situation gave Britain, which had a controlling interest in the Suez Canal, a reason to protect its investments by occupying the country in 1882.81 It was not until 1956 that Britain removed all of its troops from Egypt.

Since the 19th century, in spite of the debates between modernists and traditionalists about developments in Muslim societies, we have seen the emergence of many modern Muslim states—complete, of course, with museums, libraries, hospitals, schools, universities and urban skyscrapers, including the world’s tallest buildings in Kuala Lumpur.XIII The record shows that Islam is not averse to science or technology. The problem is that there are not enough resources to provide Muslim populations with equal opportunities in education and employment and not enough political resilience in many governments to allow the people to participate in the political process. The debate is also about values—how to protect a society’s traditional cultural heritage and practices in an age of globalization and how to develop a creative coexistence between modernism and traditionalism without Westernization.

Overall, though, most Muslim nations are considered “developing” nations. Despite countless attempts at modernizing along Western models through the 20th century, most Muslim societies have not been able to surmount barriers in worldwide economic competition. A major problem for modernizers, right up to the present day, has been the structure of their education systems. While colonial governments established some Western-style schools, many traditional Muslims responded by expanding religious schools, often with strictly religious curricula.82 Most rudimentary Muslim religious school systems have long relied on rote learning and concentrated on the fundamentals of Islamic culture and religion, often excluding from the curriculum math, science, history, languages and foreign literature—in short, anything considered Western or foreign.

To put the problems faced by Muslim societies in perspective, then, one should be reminded that the problems they confronted, and still do confront, were not endemic to Muslim societies. Japan, Korea, China and other societies in the 17th through the 19th centuries faced similar challenges. They blamed their decline in power on the West, rejected modernism and sought isolationism as the best way to preserve their independence as well as their historical legacies. In Japan, for example, it was not until the Meiji Restoration in 1868 that modernization and Westernization began to take place. It is also interesting to note that Japan’s intellectual dependence on the West lasted for only a generation after European-style universities had been imported.83

Today, many Muslims are cognizant of the shortcomings in their institutional development, economies, social progress and systems of education. Referring to primitive religious education in Muslim countries, Mohamed Charfi writes, “The consequences of such teachings on the minds of young people in most Muslim-majority countries have been disastrous.” Charfi is a former minister of education in Tunisia, which began modernizing its educational system and curricula in 1989.XIV Also excluded from these schools in some societies are girls and women, which, of course, deals a major blow in their respective countries to economic and social development—not to mention to women’s rights and the stewardship of the next generation of children.

Muslim countries have also been hamstrung by a shortage of quality institutions in higher education, especially their lack of modern universities with state-of-the-art scientific laboratories and appropriate faculty to train scientists.XV The combination of these factors has resulted in a woefully inadequate number of scientists in Muslim countries—by one recent estimate, less than 1 percent of the world’s scientists are Muslims, even though Muslims account for almost 20 percent of the world’s population.84 The situation is aggravated by Muslim countries that send students abroad to study, as most of these students do not return, causing a brain drain—as well as lost opportunities for bringing new ideas back to their Muslim homelands. There is no doubt that the educational systems of all Muslim countries need to be strengthened and modernized, which includes encouraging academic freedom for teaching and research.XVI

A group of Muslim scholars has recently issued a landmark study about the dire situation in Arab societies. The study, “The Arab Human Development Report 2002,” was published in June by the United Nations Development Program and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. It is important to note that the study represents the “unbiased, objective analysis” of “a group of distinguished Arab intellectuals”—nearly 30 scholars in Islamic sociology, economics and culture. It was written by Nader Fergany, a prominent labor economist in Egypt. The project’s advisory board included Thoraya Obaid, a Saudi who heads the UN Population Fund; Mervat Tallawy, an Egyptian diplomat; and Clovis Maksoud, who heads the Center for the Global South at American University in Washington. Some of the scholars’ assessments about the status of 22 Arab nations:

 

  1. Intellectual and cultural isolation: Arab publishers translate into Arabic only about 330 books a year, or one-fifth the number that the Greeks translate into Greek. To put this in perspective, during the past 1,000 years, the entire Arab world has translated into Arabic only as many books as Spanish publishers now annually translate into Spanish. There is also a “severe shortage” of new writing by Arabs. Filmmaking is declining. Internet use is low, lower even than in sub-Saharan Africa, and only about 1 in 100 Arabs has a personal computer.
  2. Research and development is minimal: With Arab nations spending less than one-seventh of the world average annual investment in research, in relation to the size of overall national economies, Arab achievements in science and technology are very limited.
  3. Productivity is declining: The growth in per capita income has stalled for two decades, to a level just above that of sub-Saharan Africa. About 15 percent of the labor force was unemployed. Forty years ago, Arab productivity was 32 percent of the North American level; by 1990, it had fallen to 19 percent.
  4. Education is inadequate: While Arab nations spend more on education than elsewhere in the developing world, more than one in four Arabs is illiterate, and half of Arab women cannot read or write. About 10 million children (6 to 15 years old) do not go to school. Worse still, “There is evidence that the quality of education has deteriorated.”
  5. Wasteful of human resources: Women are routinely denied advancement in the workplace. “Sadly, the Arab world is depriving itself of the creativity and productivity of half of its citizens.”
  6. Poverty of opportunities: Due to its overall oil wealth, the Arab region has the (developing) world’s lowest level of abject poverty (measured as incomes of less than $1 a day), yet more than one in five Arabs lives on less than $2 a day. “The Arab region is hobbled by a different kind of poverty—poverty of capabilities and poverty of opportunities.”
  7. Freedom denied: According to two international indices that are widely used to compare levels of freedom—including free speech, civil rights, political rights, free press and government accountability—the Arab region has the lowest level of freedom of any of the world’s seven regions. “The attitudes of public authorities range from opposition to manipulation to ‘freedom under surveillance.’”
  8. Social and political stagnation: “The wave of democracy that transformed governance in most of Latin America and East Asia in the 1980s and early 1990s has barely reached the Arab states. This freedom deficit undermines human development.”
  9. High maternal mortality rate: Four times worse than in East Asia.
  10. Population explosion: Currently, the 22 Arab states have a total population of 280 million; that is projected to grow to between 410 million and 459 million by 2020. Today, 38 percent of Arabs are under 14 years old.
  11. Brain drain: Half of Arab youths say they want to emigrate.

In the study, the scholars conclude: “What the region needs to ensure a bright future for coming generations is the political will to invest in Arab capabilities and knowledge, particularly those of Arab women, in good governance, and in strong cooperation between Arab nations.... The Arab world is at a crossroads. The fundamental choice is whether its trajectory will remain marked by inertia...and by ineffective policies that have produced the substantial development challenges facing the region; or whether prospects for an Arab renaissance, anchored in human development, will be actively pursued.”85

Flashback: The Impact of World War I on Muslim Realms

World War I, in a dramatic way, once again confirmed the answer to the big question: Is there a single, unified “Muslim world”—with one umma, under one Caliph, that transcends political and religious divisions in all Muslim realms? The stage was set in 1914, when the Young Turks of the Ottoman empire joined the Central Powers—the German and Austria-Hungary empires—against the Allied Powers—Britain, France and Russia.

On November 25, 1914, shortly after declaring war against the Allied Powers, the Caliph, Sultan Mehmed V (1844–1918), called for Muslims worldwide to join the Ottomans in their own jihad, or holy war. The proclamation stated, “The Muslims in general who are under the oppressive grasp of the aforesaid tyrannical governments in such places as the Crimea, Kazan, Turkestan, Bukhara, Khiva, and India, and those dwelling in China, Afghanistan, Africa and other regions of the earth, are hastening to join in this Great Jihad to the best of their ability, with life and property, alongside the Ottomans, in conformity with the relevant holy Fatwas.”86

The Caliph’s fatwa, legal decree, failed. The monolithic unity of Islam appeared to be only an idealistic abstraction. National, ethnic, dynastic, regional, cultural, class and tribal interests proved stronger than the majestic appeal of the Caliph. Not only did Muslims outside of the empire fight against the Ottomans in the ranks of their enemies—the British and French forces and their allies—there was also a revolt of Muslims within the empire itself. Pursuing ethnic, dynastic and even religious agendas, Muslims in Arabia—including Hashemites, the traditional guardians of Islam’s holy sites, and puri